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Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian

Masterton, George LU (2015) In Erkenntnis 80(2). p.403-432
Abstract
According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson's prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson's calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance... (More)
According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson's prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson's calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson's original proposal. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Equivocation, Calibration, Objective Bayesianism, Entropy maximization, Jon Williamson
in
Erkenntnis
volume
80
issue
2
pages
403 - 432
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000351838800009
  • scopus:84925703629
ISSN
1572-8420
DOI
10.1007/s10670-014-9649-2
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
29765a31-77fe-40a3-b078-e35f55925323 (old id 5277797)
date added to LUP
2015-04-24 09:29:01
date last changed
2017-02-19 03:16:18
@article{29765a31-77fe-40a3-b078-e35f55925323,
  abstract     = {According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson's prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson's calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson's original proposal.},
  author       = {Masterton, George},
  issn         = {1572-8420},
  keyword      = {Equivocation,Calibration,Objective Bayesianism,Entropy maximization,Jon Williamson},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {403--432},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Erkenntnis},
  title        = {Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9649-2},
  volume       = {80},
  year         = {2015},
}