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Incommensurability and Vagueness

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU (2009) In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83. p.71-94
Abstract
Two items are commensurable in value if and only if one of them is better than the other or if they are equally as good. They are incommensurable if none of these relations obtains. Given incommensurability, not even a purely ordinal measure is available for comparison: We cannot represent the relationship between the items by assigning a number to each that specifies the position of that item in the value ordering.

This paper casts doubts on John Broome’s argument that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability. It also shows how vagueness can be injected into a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting... (More)
Two items are commensurable in value if and only if one of them is better than the other or if they are equally as good. They are incommensurable if none of these relations obtains. Given incommensurability, not even a purely ordinal measure is available for comparison: We cannot represent the relationship between the items by assigning a number to each that specifies the position of that item in the value ordering.

This paper casts doubts on John Broome’s argument that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability. It also shows how vagueness can be injected into a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’-analysis of value. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
volume
83
pages
71 - 94
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • scopus:65849455029
ISSN
1467-9264
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
53a27b35-9a90-4490-a613-70d24a0e2c52 (old id 1458832)
date added to LUP
2009-09-18 11:42:58
date last changed
2017-01-01 04:43:49
@article{53a27b35-9a90-4490-a613-70d24a0e2c52,
  abstract     = {Two items are commensurable in value if and only if one of them is better than the other or if they are equally as good. They are incommensurable if none of these relations obtains. Given incommensurability, not even a purely ordinal measure is available for comparison: We cannot represent the relationship between the items by assigning a number to each that specifies the position of that item in the value ordering.<br/><br>
 This paper casts doubts on John Broome’s argument that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability. It also shows how vagueness can be injected into a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’-analysis of value.},
  author       = {Rabinowicz, Wlodek},
  issn         = {1467-9264},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {71--94},
  publisher    = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  series       = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
  title        = {Incommensurability and Vagueness},
  volume       = {83},
  year         = {2009},
}