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Whatever it is better to be than not to be

Lembke, Martin LU (2013) In International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74(1). p.131-143
Abstract
The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Anselm, God, Universal value-commensurability, Greatness, Possibilism, Actualism, Morality, Actuality
in
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
volume
74
issue
1
pages
131 - 143
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000322721700010
  • scopus:84881040793
ISSN
0020-7047
DOI
10.1007/s11153-012-9369-y
language
English
LU publication?
yes
additional info
The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Centre for Theology and Religious Studies (015017000)
id
53f63122-cef2-4a95-82a1-6d195ef7abf6 (old id 3051188)
alternative location
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11153-012-9369-y
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 14:24:11
date last changed
2022-01-28 00:24:18
@article{53f63122-cef2-4a95-82a1-6d195ef7abf6,
  abstract     = {{The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.}},
  author       = {{Lembke, Martin}},
  issn         = {{0020-7047}},
  keywords     = {{Anselm; God; Universal value-commensurability; Greatness; Possibilism; Actualism; Morality; Actuality}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{131--143}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{International Journal for Philosophy of Religion}},
  title        = {{Whatever it is better to be than not to be}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9369-y}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s11153-012-9369-y}},
  volume       = {{74}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}