Whatever it is better to be than not to be
(2013) In International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74(1). p.131-143- Abstract
- The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3051188
- author
- Lembke, Martin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Anselm, God, Universal value-commensurability, Greatness, Possibilism, Actualism, Morality, Actuality
- in
- International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- volume
- 74
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 131 - 143
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000322721700010
- scopus:84881040793
- ISSN
- 0020-7047
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11153-012-9369-y
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Centre for Theology and Religious Studies (015017000)
- id
- 53f63122-cef2-4a95-82a1-6d195ef7abf6 (old id 3051188)
- alternative location
- http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11153-012-9369-y
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:24:11
- date last changed
- 2022-01-28 00:24:18
@article{53f63122-cef2-4a95-82a1-6d195ef7abf6, abstract = {{The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.}}, author = {{Lembke, Martin}}, issn = {{0020-7047}}, keywords = {{Anselm; God; Universal value-commensurability; Greatness; Possibilism; Actualism; Morality; Actuality}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{131--143}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{International Journal for Philosophy of Religion}}, title = {{Whatever it is better to be than not to be}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9369-y}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11153-012-9369-y}}, volume = {{74}}, year = {{2013}}, }