A pragmatic defense of Millianism
Båve, Arvid LU
(2008)
In Philosophical Studies
138(2).
p.271-289
- Abstract
- A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions).
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5527c52c-5471-4851-89aa-6fd94a5ac83e
- author
- Båve, Arvid
LU
- publishing date
- 2008-03-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Philosophical Studies
- volume
- 138
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 271 - 289
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:38949158767
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11098-006-9037-0
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 5527c52c-5471-4851-89aa-6fd94a5ac83e
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-08 00:34:41
- date last changed
- 2025-10-14 09:06:59
@article{5527c52c-5471-4851-89aa-6fd94a5ac83e,
abstract = {{A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions).}},
author = {{Båve, Arvid}},
issn = {{0031-8116}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{03}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{271--289}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophical Studies}},
title = {{A pragmatic defense of Millianism}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9037-0}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11098-006-9037-0}},
volume = {{138}},
year = {{2008}},
}