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When is any agent a moral agent?: reflections on machine consciousness and moral agency

Parthemore, Joel LU and Whitby, Blay (2013) In International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5(1). p.105-129
Abstract
In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of conceptual preconditions for being a moral agent and then outline how one should – and should not – go about attributing moral agency. In place of a litmus test for such agency – such as Colin Allen et al ’s Moral Turing Test – we suggest some tools from conceptual spaces theory and the... (More)
In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of conceptual preconditions for being a moral agent and then outline how one should – and should not – go about attributing moral agency. In place of a litmus test for such agency – such as Colin Allen et al ’s Moral Turing Test – we suggest some tools from conceptual spaces theory and the unified conceptual space theory for mapping out the nature and extent of that agency. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
moral agency, Moral Turing Test, self, akrasia, concepts, conceptual spaces
in
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
volume
5
issue
1
pages
105 - 129
publisher
World Scientific
ISSN
1793-8430
project
Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (CCS)
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
55c490f7-5ea7-4f8d-902a-43afa73d6acd (old id 3412193)
date added to LUP
2013-01-29 17:29:14
date last changed
2016-04-16 06:01:53
@article{55c490f7-5ea7-4f8d-902a-43afa73d6acd,
  abstract     = {In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of conceptual preconditions for being a moral agent and then outline how one should – and should not – go about attributing moral agency. In place of a litmus test for such agency – such as Colin Allen et al ’s Moral Turing Test – we suggest some tools from conceptual spaces theory and the unified conceptual space theory for mapping out the nature and extent of that agency.},
  author       = {Parthemore, Joel and Whitby, Blay},
  issn         = {1793-8430},
  keyword      = {moral agency,Moral Turing Test,self,akrasia,concepts,conceptual spaces},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {105--129},
  publisher    = {World Scientific},
  series       = {International Journal of Machine Consciousness},
  title        = {When is any agent a moral agent?: reflections on machine consciousness and moral agency},
  volume       = {5},
  year         = {2013},
}