Keeping Context in Mind : A Non-Semantic Explanation of Apparent Context-Sensitivity
(2023) In Linguistics and Philosophy- Abstract
- Arguments for context-sensitivity are often based on judgments about the truth values of sentences: a sentence seems true in one context and false in another, so it is argued that the truth conditions of the sentence shift between these contexts. Such arguments rely on the assumption that our judgments reflect the actual truth values of sentences in context. Here, I present a non-semantic explanation of these judgments. In short, our judgments about the truth values of sentences are driven by heuristics that are only fallible reflections of actual truth values. These heuristics can lead to different truth-value judgments in different contexts, even when the sentence at issue is not semantically contextsensitive. As a case study, I consider... (More)
- Arguments for context-sensitivity are often based on judgments about the truth values of sentences: a sentence seems true in one context and false in another, so it is argued that the truth conditions of the sentence shift between these contexts. Such arguments rely on the assumption that our judgments reflect the actual truth values of sentences in context. Here, I present a non-semantic explanation of these judgments. In short, our judgments about the truth values of sentences are driven by heuristics that are only fallible reflections of actual truth values. These heuristics can lead to different truth-value judgments in different contexts, even when the sentence at issue is not semantically contextsensitive. As a case study, I consider Sterken’s (2015a) argument for the contextsensitivity of generic generalisations. I provide a non-semantic explanation of Sterken’s truth-value judgments, which builds on Leslie’s (2007; 2008) theory of default generalisation. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/581fb081-0573-4881-b4b0-1688b940f45f
- author
- Bowker, Mark LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- epub
- subject
- in
- Linguistics and Philosophy
- pages
- 19 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85174020839
- ISSN
- 1573-0549
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10988-023-09396-z
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 581fb081-0573-4881-b4b0-1688b940f45f
- date added to LUP
- 2023-10-16 12:14:13
- date last changed
- 2023-12-13 14:59:12
@article{581fb081-0573-4881-b4b0-1688b940f45f,
abstract = {{Arguments for context-sensitivity are often based on judgments about the truth values of sentences: a sentence seems true in one context and false in another, so it is argued that the truth conditions of the sentence shift between these contexts. Such arguments rely on the assumption that our judgments reflect the actual truth values of sentences in context. Here, I present a non-semantic explanation of these judgments. In short, our judgments about the truth values of sentences are driven by heuristics that are only fallible reflections of actual truth values. These heuristics can lead to different truth-value judgments in different contexts, even when the sentence at issue is not semantically contextsensitive. As a case study, I consider Sterken’s (2015a) argument for the contextsensitivity of generic generalisations. I provide a non-semantic explanation of Sterken’s truth-value judgments, which builds on Leslie’s (2007; 2008) theory of default generalisation.}},
author = {{Bowker, Mark}},
issn = {{1573-0549}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Linguistics and Philosophy}},
title = {{Keeping Context in Mind : A Non-Semantic Explanation of Apparent Context-Sensitivity}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-023-09396-z}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10988-023-09396-z}},
year = {{2023}},
}