Some spanners in the works of grounding mechanisms removed
(2022) In Axiomathes 32(S2). p.293-310- Abstract
- In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.
- Abstract (Swedish)
- In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threat-ens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explana-tion; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5e5e0587-be1c-4000-ba7e-dc89fc080ea7
- author
- Stenwall, Robin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Metaphysical explanation, Metaphysical grounding, Mechanisms, Causation
- in
- Axiomathes
- volume
- 32
- issue
- S2
- pages
- 293 - 310
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85117233570
- ISSN
- 1122-1151
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10516-021-09603-1
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 5e5e0587-be1c-4000-ba7e-dc89fc080ea7
- date added to LUP
- 2021-10-01 11:05:32
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:23:01
@article{5e5e0587-be1c-4000-ba7e-dc89fc080ea7,
abstract = {{In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.}},
author = {{Stenwall, Robin}},
issn = {{1122-1151}},
keywords = {{Metaphysical explanation; Metaphysical grounding; Mechanisms; Causation}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{S2}},
pages = {{293--310}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Axiomathes}},
title = {{Some spanners in the works of grounding mechanisms removed}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09603-1}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10516-021-09603-1}},
volume = {{32}},
year = {{2022}},
}