Prioritarianism, timeslices, and prudential value
(2022) In Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100(3). p.595-604- Abstract
- This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are... (More)
- This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5e600d3d-f2e5-4ce8-aa31-c1b217be1cc4
- author
- Andrić, Vuko and Herlitz, Anders LU
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- prioritarianism, axiology, prudential value, delay of gratification, Weak Pareto
- in
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- volume
- 100
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 10 pages
- publisher
- Routledge
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85107114414
- ISSN
- 0004-8402
- DOI
- 10.1080/00048402.2021.1920043
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 5e600d3d-f2e5-4ce8-aa31-c1b217be1cc4
- date added to LUP
- 2023-10-27 10:04:31
- date last changed
- 2023-11-01 14:19:37
@article{5e600d3d-f2e5-4ce8-aa31-c1b217be1cc4,
abstract = {{This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.}},
author = {{Andrić, Vuko and Herlitz, Anders}},
issn = {{0004-8402}},
keywords = {{prioritarianism; axiology; prudential value; delay of gratification; Weak Pareto}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{595--604}},
publisher = {{Routledge}},
series = {{Australasian Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{Prioritarianism, timeslices, and prudential value}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1920043}},
doi = {{10.1080/00048402.2021.1920043}},
volume = {{100}},
year = {{2022}},
}