Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators
(2007) 14th International Workshop, FSE 2007 4593. p.274-289- Abstract
- Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are... (More)
- Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/601567
- author
- Englund, Håkan LU ; Johansson, Thomas LU and Hell, Martin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- distinguishing attack, Stream ciphers, eSTREAM, Pomaranch., resynchronization attack
- host publication
- Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- editor
- Biryukov, Alex
- volume
- 4593
- pages
- 274 - 289
- publisher
- Springer
- conference name
- 14th International Workshop, FSE 2007
- conference dates
- 2007-03-26 - 2007-03-28
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000249783100018
- scopus:38149083587
- ISSN
- 0302-9743
- 1611-3349
- ISBN
- 978-3-540-74617-1
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_18
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d4de012b-7c96-4df7-bc06-2d4e93b0d1b7 (old id 601567)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:33:57
- date last changed
- 2025-01-02 22:35:45
@inproceedings{d4de012b-7c96-4df7-bc06-2d4e93b0d1b7, abstract = {{Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks.}}, author = {{Englund, Håkan and Johansson, Thomas and Hell, Martin}}, booktitle = {{Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science}}, editor = {{Biryukov, Alex}}, isbn = {{978-3-540-74617-1}}, issn = {{0302-9743}}, keywords = {{distinguishing attack; Stream ciphers; eSTREAM; Pomaranch.; resynchronization attack}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{274--289}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_18}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_18}}, volume = {{4593}}, year = {{2007}}, }