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Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators

Englund, Håkan LU ; Johansson, Thomas LU and Hell, Martin LU (2007) 14th International Workshop, FSE 2007 In Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4593. p.274-289
Abstract
Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are... (More)
Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
distinguishing attack, Stream ciphers, eSTREAM, Pomaranch., resynchronization attack
in
Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science
editor
Biryukov, Alex and
volume
4593
pages
274 - 289
publisher
Springer
conference name
14th International Workshop, FSE 2007
external identifiers
  • wos:000249783100018
  • scopus:38149083587
ISSN
1611-3349
0302-9743
ISBN
978-3-540-74617-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_18
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
d4de012b-7c96-4df7-bc06-2d4e93b0d1b7 (old id 601567)
date added to LUP
2007-11-21 10:30:16
date last changed
2017-06-11 03:56:06
@inproceedings{d4de012b-7c96-4df7-bc06-2d4e93b0d1b7,
  abstract     = {Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks.},
  author       = {Englund, Håkan and Johansson, Thomas and Hell, Martin},
  booktitle    = {Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  editor       = {Biryukov, Alex},
  isbn         = {978-3-540-74617-1},
  issn         = {1611-3349},
  keyword      = {distinguishing attack,Stream ciphers,eSTREAM,Pomaranch.,resynchronization attack},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {274--289},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  title        = {Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_18},
  volume       = {4593},
  year         = {2007},
}