A note on distinguishing attacks
(2007) IEEE Information Theory Workshop on Information Theory for Wireless Networks p.87-90- Abstract
- A new distinguishing attack scenario for stream ciphers, allowing a resynchronization collision attack, is presented. The attack can succeed if the part of the state that depends on both the key and the IV is smaller than twice the key size. It is shown that the attack is applicable to block ciphers in OFB mode. For OFB mode, the attack is more powerful than the previously known generic distinguishing attack since it will directly recover a part of the plaintext while having the same asymptotic complexity as the generic distinguishing attack. The attack is also demonstrated on the eSTREAM candidate LEX. LEX is not vulnerable to any of the previously known generic distinguishing attack but is vulnerable to the new attack. It is shown that... (More)
- A new distinguishing attack scenario for stream ciphers, allowing a resynchronization collision attack, is presented. The attack can succeed if the part of the state that depends on both the key and the IV is smaller than twice the key size. It is shown that the attack is applicable to block ciphers in OFB mode. For OFB mode, the attack is more powerful than the previously known generic distinguishing attack since it will directly recover a part of the plaintext while having the same asymptotic complexity as the generic distinguishing attack. The attack is also demonstrated on the eSTREAM candidate LEX. LEX is not vulnerable to any of the previously known generic distinguishing attack but is vulnerable to the new attack. It is shown that if approximately 265.7 resynchronizations using LEX are performed for the same key, some plaintext might be recovered. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/603347
- author
- Englund, Håkan
LU
; Hell, Martin
LU
and Johansson, Thomas
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- [Host publication title missing]
- pages
- 87 - 90
- publisher
- IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
- conference name
- IEEE Information Theory Workshop on Information Theory for Wireless Networks
- conference location
- Bergen, Norway
- conference dates
- 2007-07-01 - 2007-07-06
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000250957300018
- scopus:47849094098
- ISBN
- 978-1-4244-1200-6
- DOI
- 10.1109/ITWITWN.2007.4318038
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- c6ff073f-72c3-4a82-9369-5006532484d7 (old id 603347)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 11:45:42
- date last changed
- 2023-09-06 11:47:35
@inproceedings{c6ff073f-72c3-4a82-9369-5006532484d7, abstract = {{A new distinguishing attack scenario for stream ciphers, allowing a resynchronization collision attack, is presented. The attack can succeed if the part of the state that depends on both the key and the IV is smaller than twice the key size. It is shown that the attack is applicable to block ciphers in OFB mode. For OFB mode, the attack is more powerful than the previously known generic distinguishing attack since it will directly recover a part of the plaintext while having the same asymptotic complexity as the generic distinguishing attack. The attack is also demonstrated on the eSTREAM candidate LEX. LEX is not vulnerable to any of the previously known generic distinguishing attack but is vulnerable to the new attack. It is shown that if approximately 265.7 resynchronizations using LEX are performed for the same key, some plaintext might be recovered.}}, author = {{Englund, Håkan and Hell, Martin and Johansson, Thomas}}, booktitle = {{[Host publication title missing]}}, isbn = {{978-1-4244-1200-6}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{87--90}}, publisher = {{IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.}}, title = {{A note on distinguishing attacks}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ITWITWN.2007.4318038}}, doi = {{10.1109/ITWITWN.2007.4318038}}, year = {{2007}}, }