Physical Necessity and Necessity Tout Court.
(2012) In Metaphysica 13. p.175-182- Abstract
- The very last of words of Naming and Necessity are `The third lecture
suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as
mere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question
how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work.' Kripke (1980).
To my knowledge he never conducted that further work; moreover, no
one following him has wished to take up the baton either. Herein, I argue
that, in general, physical necessity is neither reducible to, nor implies,
tout court necessity. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that even if Kripke's
speculations are restricted to a subset of the physical necessities where it
might be... (More) - The very last of words of Naming and Necessity are `The third lecture
suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as
mere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question
how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work.' Kripke (1980).
To my knowledge he never conducted that further work; moreover, no
one following him has wished to take up the baton either. Herein, I argue
that, in general, physical necessity is neither reducible to, nor implies,
tout court necessity. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that even if Kripke's
speculations are restricted to a subset of the physical necessities where it
might be granted that all such are necessary tout court, physical necessity
is still not reducible to tout court necessity. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3357882
- author
- Masterton, George LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Metaphysica
- volume
- 13
- pages
- 175 - 182
- publisher
- Springer
- ISSN
- 1437-2053
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 6071e47e-a3b1-4c22-9e54-bffe1e139fc7 (old id 3357882)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:16:33
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 19:43:39
@article{6071e47e-a3b1-4c22-9e54-bffe1e139fc7,
abstract = {{The very last of words of Naming and Necessity are `The third lecture<br/><br>
suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as<br/><br>
mere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question<br/><br>
how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work.' Kripke (1980).<br/><br>
To my knowledge he never conducted that further work; moreover, no<br/><br>
one following him has wished to take up the baton either. Herein, I argue<br/><br>
that, in general, physical necessity is neither reducible to, nor implies,<br/><br>
tout court necessity. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that even if Kripke's<br/><br>
speculations are restricted to a subset of the physical necessities where it<br/><br>
might be granted that all such are necessary tout court, physical necessity<br/><br>
is still not reducible to tout court necessity.}},
author = {{Masterton, George}},
issn = {{1437-2053}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{175--182}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Metaphysica}},
title = {{Physical Necessity and Necessity Tout Court.}},
volume = {{13}},
year = {{2012}},
}