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We-experiences, common knowledge and the mode approach to collective intentionality

Blomberg, Olle LU (2018) In Journal of Social Philosophy 49(1). p.183-203
Abstract
According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a “we-experience”—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject “as ours” rather than merely “as my experience” (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti and Frith (2013) and Schmitz (2017) present we-mode accounts that are supposed to, in particular, avoid the need for the subjects of experience to have common knowledge of each other’s perceptual beliefs. In this paper, drawing in... (More)
According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a “we-experience”—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject “as ours” rather than merely “as my experience” (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti and Frith (2013) and Schmitz (2017) present we-mode accounts that are supposed to, in particular, avoid the need for the subjects of experience to have common knowledge of each other’s perceptual beliefs. In this paper, drawing in part on Schutz’s (1932/1967; 1953) writings on “the pure We-relationship”, I argue that appeal to a we-mode does not render common knowledge unnecessary. To explain when we-experiences are veridical, we-mode accounts must (i) explain how a we-experience can enable rational interpersonal coordination in some high-risk situations and (ii) explain why what is experienced is “out in the open” between the subjects of the we-experience. To do this, proponents of we-mode accounts need an account of common knowledge. In addition, they must specify which inferences hold between we-mode and I-mode attitudes, and explain why these inferences hold. In light of this, we-mode accounts fare no better than content accounts in illuminating how basic forms of collective intentionality are possible. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Journal of Social Philosophy
volume
49
issue
1
pages
183 - 203
publisher
Wiley Online Library
external identifiers
  • scopus:85045252174
ISSN
1467-9833
DOI
10.1111/josp.12221
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
618d7244-1fe2-400c-9b21-53a0c9574f65
date added to LUP
2017-10-14 15:48:28
date last changed
2018-04-22 04:32:54
@article{618d7244-1fe2-400c-9b21-53a0c9574f65,
  abstract     = {According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a “we-experience”—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject “as ours” rather than merely “as my experience” (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti and Frith (2013) and Schmitz (2017) present we-mode accounts that are supposed to, in particular, avoid the need for the subjects of experience to have common knowledge of each other’s perceptual beliefs. In this paper, drawing in part on Schutz’s (1932/1967; 1953) writings on “the pure We-relationship”, I argue that appeal to a we-mode does not render common knowledge unnecessary. To explain when we-experiences are veridical, we-mode accounts must (i) explain how a we-experience can enable rational interpersonal coordination in some high-risk situations and (ii) explain why what is experienced is “out in the open” between the subjects of the we-experience. To do this, proponents of we-mode accounts need an account of common knowledge. In addition, they must specify which inferences hold between we-mode and I-mode attitudes, and explain why these inferences hold. In light of this, we-mode accounts fare no better than content accounts in illuminating how basic forms of collective intentionality are possible.},
  author       = {Blomberg, Olle},
  issn         = {1467-9833},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {183--203},
  publisher    = {Wiley Online Library},
  series       = {Journal of Social Philosophy},
  title        = {We-experiences, common knowledge and the mode approach to collective intentionality},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12221},
  volume       = {49},
  year         = {2018},
}