The exercise of discretion in international law – why constraining criteria have a proper place in the analysis of legal decision-making
(2021) In German Yearbook of International Law 62(1). p.407-430- Abstract
In international law, the exercise of legal discretion is constrained by criteria, such as the abuse of rights doctrine and the principle of legal certainty. The hitherto research of these criteria gives reason to take up a discussion on the appropriate way of conceptualising discretion and constraining criteria. This article, in contrast to the belief of other scholars, makes a case for the understanding of the exercise of discretion as an activity separate from legal interpretation. As it insists, the application of a constraining criterion is wholly distinct from the form of arguments that can be derived from rules of interpretation.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/6373e1c0-8558-4cd6-bfa8-46b67fc8b33a
- author
- Linderfalk, Ulf LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2021
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Constraining Criteria, Discretion, Exercise of Discretion, Interpretation, Rules of Interpretation
- in
- German Yearbook of International Law
- volume
- 62
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 24 pages
- publisher
- Duncker & Humblot
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85102356640
- ISSN
- 0344-3094
- DOI
- 10.3790/gyil.62.1.407
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 6373e1c0-8558-4cd6-bfa8-46b67fc8b33a
- date added to LUP
- 2021-03-29 09:44:50
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 13:56:54
@article{6373e1c0-8558-4cd6-bfa8-46b67fc8b33a,
abstract = {{<p>In international law, the exercise of legal discretion is constrained by criteria, such as the abuse of rights doctrine and the principle of legal certainty. The hitherto research of these criteria gives reason to take up a discussion on the appropriate way of conceptualising discretion and constraining criteria. This article, in contrast to the belief of other scholars, makes a case for the understanding of the exercise of discretion as an activity separate from legal interpretation. As it insists, the application of a constraining criterion is wholly distinct from the form of arguments that can be derived from rules of interpretation.</p>}},
author = {{Linderfalk, Ulf}},
issn = {{0344-3094}},
keywords = {{Constraining Criteria; Discretion; Exercise of Discretion; Interpretation; Rules of Interpretation}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{407--430}},
publisher = {{Duncker & Humblot}},
series = {{German Yearbook of International Law}},
title = {{The exercise of discretion in international law – why constraining criteria have a proper place in the analysis of legal decision-making}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/gyil.62.1.407}},
doi = {{10.3790/gyil.62.1.407}},
volume = {{62}},
year = {{2021}},
}