A key-recovery timing attack on post-quantum primitives using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and its application on FrodoKEM
Guo, Qian LU ; Johansson, Thomas LU
and Nilsson, Alexander
LU
(2020)
40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020
In Lecture Notes in Computer Science
12171.
p.359-386
- Abstract
- In the implementation of post-quantum primitives, it is well known that all computations that handle secret information need to be implemented to run in constant time. Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation or any of its different variants, a CPA-secure primitive can be converted into an IND-CCA secure KEM. In this paper we show that although the transformation does not handle secret information apart from calls to the CPA-secure primitive, it has to be implemented in constant time. Namely, if the ciphertext comparison step in the transformation is leaking side-channel information, we can launch a key-recovery attack. Several proposed schemes in round 2 of the NIST post-quantum standardization project are susceptible to the proposed... (More)
- In the implementation of post-quantum primitives, it is well known that all computations that handle secret information need to be implemented to run in constant time. Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation or any of its different variants, a CPA-secure primitive can be converted into an IND-CCA secure KEM. In this paper we show that although the transformation does not handle secret information apart from calls to the CPA-secure primitive, it has to be implemented in constant time. Namely, if the ciphertext comparison step in the transformation is leaking side-channel information, we can launch a key-recovery attack. Several proposed schemes in round 2 of the NIST post-quantum standardization project are susceptible to the proposed attack and we develop and show the details of the attack on one of them, being FrodoKEM. It is implemented on the reference implementation of FrodoKEM, which is claimed to be secure against all timing attacks. Experiments show that the attack code is able to extract the secret key for all security levels using about $2^{30}$ decapsulation calls. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/65d795f6-1a59-45c0-aa6e-45467fe15e03
- author
- Guo, Qian
LU
; Johansson, Thomas
LU
and Nilsson, Alexander
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020-08-17
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020 : 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17–21, 2020, Proceedings, Part II - 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17–21, 2020, Proceedings, Part II
- series title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- volume
- 12171
- pages
- 359 - 386
- publisher
- Springer
- conference name
- 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020
- conference location
- Santa Barbara, United States
- conference dates
- 2020-08-17 - 2020-08-21
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85089719168
- ISSN
- 0302-9743
- 1611-3349
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-56880-1
- 978-3-030-56879-5
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-56880-1_13
- project
- Side channels on software implementations of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms
- Lightweight Cryptography for Autonomous Vehicles
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 65d795f6-1a59-45c0-aa6e-45467fe15e03
- alternative location
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/743
- date added to LUP
- 2020-06-25 10:45:58
- date last changed
- 2024-06-13 18:39:18
@inproceedings{65d795f6-1a59-45c0-aa6e-45467fe15e03,
abstract = {{In the implementation of post-quantum primitives, it is well known that all computations that handle secret information need to be implemented to run in constant time. Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation or any of its different variants, a CPA-secure primitive can be converted into an IND-CCA secure KEM. In this paper we show that although the transformation does not handle secret information apart from calls to the CPA-secure primitive, it has to be implemented in constant time. Namely, if the ciphertext comparison step in the transformation is leaking side-channel information, we can launch a key-recovery attack. Several proposed schemes in round 2 of the NIST post-quantum standardization project are susceptible to the proposed attack and we develop and show the details of the attack on one of them, being FrodoKEM. It is implemented on the reference implementation of FrodoKEM, which is claimed to be secure against all timing attacks. Experiments show that the attack code is able to extract the secret key for all security levels using about $2^{30}$ decapsulation calls.}},
author = {{Guo, Qian and Johansson, Thomas and Nilsson, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020 : 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17–21, 2020, Proceedings, Part II}},
isbn = {{978-3-030-56880-1}},
issn = {{0302-9743}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{08}},
pages = {{359--386}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}},
title = {{A key-recovery timing attack on post-quantum primitives using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and its application on FrodoKEM}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56880-1_13}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-56880-1_13}},
volume = {{12171}},
year = {{2020}},
}