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The new explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value

Orsi, Francesco and Garcia, Andrés LU (2022) In Philosophia 50(4). p.1845-1860
Abstract
The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object (the “enabling maneuver”). In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a new explanatory objection, to the extent that the explanatory role played by the constitutive properties of attitudes in value facts is assumed to be different from the explanatory role they play in fittingness facts.
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author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Fitting attitude, account of value, Value, Fittingness, Normative explanation, Enabling conditions
in
Philosophia
volume
50
issue
4
pages
16 pages
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85128846061
ISSN
0048-3893
DOI
10.1007/s11406-022-00500-4
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
6604d4a3-1236-4b0e-bcae-3e8ecf1be53b
date added to LUP
2022-03-06 13:01:40
date last changed
2025-04-04 14:43:46
@article{6604d4a3-1236-4b0e-bcae-3e8ecf1be53b,
  abstract     = {{The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object (the “enabling maneuver”). In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a new explanatory objection, to the extent that the explanatory role played by the constitutive properties of attitudes in value facts is assumed to be different from the explanatory role they play in fittingness facts.}},
  author       = {{Orsi, Francesco and Garcia, Andrés}},
  issn         = {{0048-3893}},
  keywords     = {{Fitting attitude; account of value; Value; Fittingness; Normative explanation; Enabling conditions}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1845--1860}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Philosophia}},
  title        = {{The new explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00500-4}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s11406-022-00500-4}},
  volume       = {{50}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}