Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons
(2006) In Philosophical Quarterly 56(222). p.114-120- Abstract
- The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out... (More)
- The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/693606
- author
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2006
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Philosophical Quarterly
- volume
- 56
- issue
- 222
- pages
- 114 - 120
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000235243500008
- scopus:34548546667
- ISSN
- 0031-8094
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00432.x
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 968cbe5d-dad7-4c10-a657-21020361bffc (old id 693606)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 11:51:55
- date last changed
- 2022-03-28 08:51:55
@article{968cbe5d-dad7-4c10-a657-21020361bffc,
abstract = {{The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble.}},
author = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni}},
issn = {{0031-8094}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{222}},
pages = {{114--120}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Philosophical Quarterly}},
title = {{Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/2677524/777270.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00432.x}},
volume = {{56}},
year = {{2006}},
}