On Neutral Value and Fitting Indifference
(2023) In The Southern Journal of Philosophy- Abstract
- A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might... (More)
- A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/69fff500-e916-4cec-a536-d623bf48c84f
- author
- Garcia, Andrés LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- epub
- subject
- in
- The Southern Journal of Philosophy
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85176143655
- ISSN
- 2041-6962
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjp.12547
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 69fff500-e916-4cec-a536-d623bf48c84f
- date added to LUP
- 2023-10-16 16:48:14
- date last changed
- 2023-11-24 14:22:52
@article{69fff500-e916-4cec-a536-d623bf48c84f,
abstract = {{A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature.}},
author = {{Garcia, Andrés}},
issn = {{2041-6962}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{The Southern Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{On Neutral Value and Fitting Indifference}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12547}},
doi = {{10.1111/sjp.12547}},
year = {{2023}},
}