Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments from Inescapability
(2012) In Philosophica 85(2). p.91-121- Abstract
- Peter Strawson defends the thesis that determinism is irrelevant to the justifiability of responsibility-attributions. In this paper, I want to examine various arguments advanced by Strawson in support of this thesis. These arguments all draw on the thought that the practice of responsibility is inescapable. My main focus is not so much the metaphysical details of Strawsonian compatibilism, but rather the more fundamental idea that x being inescapable may be reason for us to regard x as justified. I divide Strawsonian inescapability arguments into two basic types. According to arguments of the first type we cannot give up the practice. According to arguments of the second type we should not give up the practice. My reasons for revisiting... (More)
- Peter Strawson defends the thesis that determinism is irrelevant to the justifiability of responsibility-attributions. In this paper, I want to examine various arguments advanced by Strawson in support of this thesis. These arguments all draw on the thought that the practice of responsibility is inescapable. My main focus is not so much the metaphysical details of Strawsonian compatibilism, but rather the more fundamental idea that x being inescapable may be reason for us to regard x as justified. I divide Strawsonian inescapability arguments into two basic types. According to arguments of the first type we cannot give up the practice. According to arguments of the second type we should not give up the practice. My reasons for revisiting these Strawsonian inescapability arguments are, first, to establish that these are different and to some extent conflicting arguments. Second, I hope to show that none of Strawson’s inescapability arguments are convincing. Third, I discuss the possibility that the practice of responsibility is inescapable in a different, more pessimistic sense than envisaged by Strawson. What may be inescapable under conceivable scenarios is the conflict of theoretical and practical considerations in the justification of the practice. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3412950
- author
- Szigeti, Andras LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- responsibility Peter Strawson determinism inescapability practical reason theoretical reason
- in
- Philosophica
- volume
- 85
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 91 - 121
- publisher
- Philosophica, Ghent
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84869412405
- ISSN
- 0379-8402
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 6ec954e3-4508-4631-99f0-4bee1e668494 (old id 3412950)
- alternative location
- http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts.php
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:13:58
- date last changed
- 2022-03-21 23:00:57
@article{6ec954e3-4508-4631-99f0-4bee1e668494,
abstract = {{Peter Strawson defends the thesis that determinism is irrelevant to the justifiability of responsibility-attributions. In this paper, I want to examine various arguments advanced by Strawson in support of this thesis. These arguments all draw on the thought that the practice of responsibility is inescapable. My main focus is not so much the metaphysical details of Strawsonian compatibilism, but rather the more fundamental idea that x being inescapable may be reason for us to regard x as justified. I divide Strawsonian inescapability arguments into two basic types. According to arguments of the first type we cannot give up the practice. According to arguments of the second type we should not give up the practice. My reasons for revisiting these Strawsonian inescapability arguments are, first, to establish that these are different and to some extent conflicting arguments. Second, I hope to show that none of Strawson’s inescapability arguments are convincing. Third, I discuss the possibility that the practice of responsibility is inescapable in a different, more pessimistic sense than envisaged by Strawson. What may be inescapable under conceivable scenarios is the conflict of theoretical and practical considerations in the justification of the practice.}},
author = {{Szigeti, Andras}},
issn = {{0379-8402}},
keywords = {{responsibility Peter Strawson determinism inescapability practical reason theoretical reason}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{91--121}},
publisher = {{Philosophica, Ghent}},
series = {{Philosophica}},
title = {{Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments from Inescapability}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/3857423/3412959.pdf}},
volume = {{85}},
year = {{2012}},
}