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Disentangling The Thick Concept Argument

Blomberg, Olle LU (2007) In SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8(2). p.63-78
Abstract
Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable... (More)
Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable intuition about a thought experiment, here called the External Standpoint Experiment (ESE). It is concluded that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently the argument is invoked. (Less)
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author
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy
volume
8
issue
2
pages
63 - 78
publisher
De Gruyter
external identifiers
  • scopus:79960829416
ISSN
1869-7577
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2007.63
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
76dbff4e-5352-4c9d-a9f2-bc9b971d0db6
date added to LUP
2017-07-04 14:58:02
date last changed
2017-10-29 05:03:49
@article{76dbff4e-5352-4c9d-a9f2-bc9b971d0db6,
  abstract     = {Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable intuition about a thought experiment, here called the External Standpoint Experiment (ESE). It is concluded that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently the argument is invoked.},
  author       = {Blomberg, Olle},
  issn         = {1869-7577},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {63--78},
  publisher    = {De Gruyter},
  series       = {SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy},
  title        = {Disentangling The Thick Concept Argument},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2007.63},
  volume       = {8},
  year         = {2007},
}