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Collective Responsibility and Acting Together

Blomberg, Olle LU and Hindriks, Frank (2019)
Abstract
What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions involved in strategic interaction. We argue, however, that this in itself is not significant. The significant difference is rather volitional: The parties to a shared intention are mutually implicated in each other’s will in a distinct... (More)
What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions involved in strategic interaction. We argue, however, that this in itself is not significant. The significant difference is rather volitional: The parties to a shared intention are mutually implicated in each other’s will in a distinct way. Since degree of blameworthiness depends on the quality of will an agent displays in her actions, this explains the higher degree of collective blameworthiness associated with shared intentional wrongdoing. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
in press
subject
host publication
The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility
editor
Bazargan-Forward, Saba ; Tollefsen, Deborah ; and
publisher
Routledge
project
The Nature of Intentional Joint Action: Coordination, Responsibility and Participant ́s Knowledge
Metaphysics and Collectivity
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
773701df-d349-4c61-99d2-1b03bea44556
date added to LUP
2019-03-29 13:47:28
date last changed
2019-04-05 11:32:35
@inbook{773701df-d349-4c61-99d2-1b03bea44556,
  abstract     = {What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions involved in strategic interaction. We argue, however, that this in itself is not significant. The significant difference is rather volitional: The parties to a shared intention are mutually implicated in each other’s will in a distinct way. Since degree of blameworthiness depends on the quality of will an agent displays in her actions, this explains the higher degree of collective blameworthiness associated with shared intentional wrongdoing.},
  author       = {Blomberg, Olle and Hindriks, Frank},
  booktitle    = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility},
  editor       = {Bazargan-Forward, Saba and Tollefsen, Deborah},
  language     = {eng},
  publisher    = {Routledge},
  title        = {Collective Responsibility and Acting Together},
  url          = {https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/62313946/Blomberg_Hindriks_Collective_Responsibility_and_Acting_Together_RoutledgeStyle_proofed_new.pdf},
  year         = {2019},
}