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Analysing Personal Value

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2007) In Journal of Ethics 11. p.405-435
Abstract
. It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favor” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person... (More)
. It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favor” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely dif-ferent notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Journal of Ethics
volume
11
pages
405 - 435
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:34548554344
ISSN
1382-4554
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
05e62146-80dc-4cee-8ced-15777251d259 (old id 779744)
date added to LUP
2008-01-15 16:37:10
date last changed
2017-01-01 06:54:07
@article{05e62146-80dc-4cee-8ced-15777251d259,
  abstract     = {. It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favor” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely dif-ferent notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.},
  author       = {Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  issn         = {1382-4554},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {405--435},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Journal of Ethics},
  title        = {Analysing Personal Value},
  volume       = {11},
  year         = {2007},
}