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Reasons and Normativity

Green Werkmäster, Jakob LU (2019)
Abstract
Normative reasons are of constant importance to us as agents trying to navigate through life. For this reason it is natural and vital to ask philosophical questions about reasons and the normative realm. This thesis explores various issues concerning reasons and normativity. The thesis consists of five free-standing
papers and an extended introduction. The aim of the extended introduction is not merely to situate the papers within a wider philosophical context but also to provide an overview of some of the central research questions concerning reasons and normativity. The introduction is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 concerns the issue of what a reason is and what different... (More)
Normative reasons are of constant importance to us as agents trying to navigate through life. For this reason it is natural and vital to ask philosophical questions about reasons and the normative realm. This thesis explores various issues concerning reasons and normativity. The thesis consists of five free-standing
papers and an extended introduction. The aim of the extended introduction is not merely to situate the papers within a wider philosophical context but also to provide an overview of some of the central research questions concerning reasons and normativity. The introduction is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 concerns the issue of what a reason is and what different types of reasons there are, such as pro tanto reasons and overall reasons. Chapter 3 discusses the frequently employed weighing metaphor, i.e. that reasons have a certain weight and can be weighed against the weight of other reasons. Chapter 4 covers how reasons relate to other normative notions such as ought, value, and obligation. For example, it discusses whether it is the case that for something to be valuable just is for there to be reasons to favor it. Chapter 5 concludes the introduction by briefly exploring how it all relates.

The thesis can be said to be embedded in a recent research trend within philosophy of normativity that has a distinguished focus on reasons.

The five papers deal with various issues concerning reasons and normativity. Paper I argues for a novel and theoretically parsimonious way to understand background conditions for values and reasons. Paper II explores an interpretation of the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism about reasons and value so as to accommodate that the distinction does not commit either party to certain first order claims about what reasons there are or what makes objects valuable. Paper III discusses the dictum ‘ought implies can’
and how to properly interpret the ‘can’. Paper IV defends principles according to which what we ought and have reasons to do transmit from ends to the necessary means of that action. Paper V analyzes how the Fitting Attitudes analysis of value should best understand degrees of value. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
supervisor
opponent
  • Docent Reisner, Andrew, Uppsala universitet
organization
alternative title
Skäl och normativitet
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
pages
232 pages
publisher
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
defense location
LUX B336
defense date
2019-10-26 10:00:00
ISBN
978-91-88899-60-6
978-91-88899-59-0
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
7867520e-d623-423a-a383-6a8faf4e0dd7
date added to LUP
2019-05-24 10:28:06
date last changed
2019-09-16 15:15:22
@phdthesis{7867520e-d623-423a-a383-6a8faf4e0dd7,
  abstract     = {Normative reasons are of constant importance to us as agents trying to navigate through life. For this reason it is natural and vital to ask philosophical questions about reasons and the normative realm. This thesis explores various issues concerning reasons and normativity. The thesis consists of five free-standing<br/>papers and an extended introduction. The aim of the extended introduction is not merely to situate the papers within a wider philosophical context but also to provide an overview of some of the central research questions concerning reasons and normativity. The introduction is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 concerns the issue of what a reason is and what different types of reasons there are, such as <i>pro tanto </i>reasons and overall reasons. Chapter 3 discusses the frequently employed weighing metaphor, i.e. that reasons have a certain weight and can be weighed against the weight of other reasons. Chapter 4 covers how reasons relate to other normative notions such as ought, value, and obligation. For example, it discusses whether it is the case that for something to be valuable just is for there to be reasons to favor it. Chapter 5 concludes the introduction by briefly exploring how it all relates.<br/><br/>The thesis can be said to be embedded in a recent research trend within philosophy of normativity that has a distinguished focus on reasons.<br/><br/>The five papers deal with various issues concerning reasons and normativity. Paper I argues for a novel and theoretically parsimonious way to understand background conditions for values and reasons. Paper II explores an interpretation of the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism about reasons and value so as to accommodate that the distinction does not commit either party to certain first order claims about what reasons there are or what makes objects valuable. Paper III discusses the dictum ‘ought implies can’<br/>and how to properly interpret the ‘can’. Paper IV defends principles according to which what we ought and have reasons to do transmit from ends to the necessary means of that action. Paper V analyzes how the Fitting Attitudes analysis of value should best understand degrees of value.},
  author       = {Green Werkmäster, Jakob},
  isbn         = {978-91-88899-60-6},
  language     = {eng},
  publisher    = {Department of Philosophy, Lund University},
  school       = {Lund University},
  title        = {Reasons and Normativity},
  url          = {https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/68831161/e_spik_ex_jakob.pdf},
  year         = {2019},
}