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Enhancing Key-Recovery Chosen-Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks on NTRU Using LDPC}

Nabokov, Denis LU ; Tong, Xiaofei LU and Guo, Qian LU (2025) p.528-531
Abstract
In this work, we introduce novel techniques for adapting the SCA-LDPC framework to NTRU-style Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs). Our approach significantly reduces the required measurements compared to prior analyses under similar oracle noise, validated through extensive simulations, and shows robustness against decision errors in the constructed oracle. Furthermore, we present the first documented power analysis attack targeting a first-order masked NTRU implementation. We constructed a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle achieving a low 0.5% decision error rate, importantly, within a practical cross-device setting where training and attack devices differ. Our results show that approximately 1250 side-channel measurements are sufficient to... (More)
In this work, we introduce novel techniques for adapting the SCA-LDPC framework to NTRU-style Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs). Our approach significantly reduces the required measurements compared to prior analyses under similar oracle noise, validated through extensive simulations, and shows robustness against decision errors in the constructed oracle. Furthermore, we present the first documented power analysis attack targeting a first-order masked NTRU implementation. We constructed a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle achieving a low 0.5% decision error rate, importantly, within a practical cross-device setting where training and attack devices differ. Our results show that approximately 1250 side-channel measurements are sufficient to recover the secret key in this challenging scenario. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
host publication
2025 IEEE 43rd International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)
pages
528 - 531
publisher
IEEE
external identifiers
  • scopus:105032498633
ISBN
979-8-3315-0346-8
DOI
10.1109/ICCD65941.2025.00081
project
Secure on Paper: Attacking Post-Quantum Cryptography in Practice
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
7a29ce86-8531-42f9-8b1c-a24ed44fbf4f
date added to LUP
2026-02-24 16:09:24
date last changed
2026-05-11 15:45:14
@inproceedings{7a29ce86-8531-42f9-8b1c-a24ed44fbf4f,
  abstract     = {{In this work, we introduce novel techniques for adapting the SCA-LDPC framework to NTRU-style Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs). Our approach significantly reduces the required measurements compared to prior analyses under similar oracle noise, validated through extensive simulations, and shows robustness against decision errors in the constructed oracle. Furthermore, we present the first documented power analysis attack targeting a first-order masked NTRU implementation. We constructed a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle achieving a low 0.5% decision error rate, importantly, within a practical cross-device setting where training and attack devices differ. Our results show that approximately 1250 side-channel measurements are sufficient to recover the secret key in this challenging scenario.}},
  author       = {{Nabokov, Denis and Tong, Xiaofei and Guo, Qian}},
  booktitle    = {{2025 IEEE 43rd International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)}},
  isbn         = {{979-8-3315-0346-8}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{528--531}},
  publisher    = {{IEEE}},
  title        = {{Enhancing Key-Recovery Chosen-Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks on NTRU Using LDPC}}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICCD65941.2025.00081}},
  doi          = {{10.1109/ICCD65941.2025.00081}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}