Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility
(2011) In Oxford Handbooks p.199-220- Abstract
- This article discusses another important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free-will debates, P. F. Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This article disentangles three strands of Strawson's argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson's view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson's view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The article concludes with... (More)
- This article discusses another important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free-will debates, P. F. Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This article disentangles three strands of Strawson's argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson's view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson's view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The article concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/7cd837a8-97cf-4a3c-840a-d9df81e9d19d
- author
- Russell, Paul LU
- publishing date
- 2011
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
- series title
- Oxford Handbooks
- editor
- Kane, Robert
- edition
- 2
- pages
- 199 - 220
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84923478631
- ISBN
- 9780199940387
- 9780195399691
- DOI
- 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0010
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 7cd837a8-97cf-4a3c-840a-d9df81e9d19d
- date added to LUP
- 2024-09-14 08:47:02
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:27:27
@inbook{7cd837a8-97cf-4a3c-840a-d9df81e9d19d,
abstract = {{This article discusses another important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free-will debates, P. F. Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This article disentangles three strands of Strawson's argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson's view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson's view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The article concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed.}},
author = {{Russell, Paul}},
booktitle = {{The Oxford Handbook of Free Will}},
editor = {{Kane, Robert}},
isbn = {{9780199940387}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{199--220}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Oxford Handbooks}},
title = {{Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0010}},
doi = {{10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0010}},
year = {{2011}},
}