Cache-Timing Attack Against HQC
(2023) In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 2023(3). p.136-163- Abstract
In this paper, we present the first chosen-ciphertext (CC) cache-timing attacks on the reference implementation of HQC. We build a cache-timing based distinguisher for implementing a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle. The PC oracle uses side-channel information to check if a given ciphertext decrypts to a given message. This is done by identifying a vulnerability during the generating process of two vectors in the reference implementation of HQC. We also propose a new method of using PC oracles for chosen-ciphertext side-channel attacks against HQC, which may have independent interest. We show a general proof-of-concept attack, where we use the Flush+Reload technique and also derive, in more detail, a practical attack on an HQC execution... (More)
In this paper, we present the first chosen-ciphertext (CC) cache-timing attacks on the reference implementation of HQC. We build a cache-timing based distinguisher for implementing a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle. The PC oracle uses side-channel information to check if a given ciphertext decrypts to a given message. This is done by identifying a vulnerability during the generating process of two vectors in the reference implementation of HQC. We also propose a new method of using PC oracles for chosen-ciphertext side-channel attacks against HQC, which may have independent interest. We show a general proof-of-concept attack, where we use the Flush+Reload technique and also derive, in more detail, a practical attack on an HQC execution on Intel SGX, where the Prime+Probe technique is used. We show the exact path to do key recovery by explaining the detailed steps, using the PC oracle. In both scenarios, the new attack requires 53, 857 traces on average with much fewer PC oracle calls than the timing attack of Guo et al. CHES 2022 on an HQC implementation.
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- author
- Huang, Senyang LU ; Sim, Rui Qi ; Chuengsatiansup, Chitchanok ; Guo, Qian LU and Johansson, Thomas LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023-06
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Code-based cryptography, HQC, NIST PQC standardization, Side-channel attacks
- in
- IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- volume
- 2023
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 28 pages
- publisher
- Ruhr-University of Bochum
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85163202033
- ISSN
- 2569-2925
- DOI
- 10.46586/tches.v2023.i3.136-163
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 7dfcf1f5-2941-42eb-83b9-a78d5e6096a2
- date added to LUP
- 2023-09-18 13:22:01
- date last changed
- 2023-11-21 22:51:40
@article{7dfcf1f5-2941-42eb-83b9-a78d5e6096a2, abstract = {{<p>In this paper, we present the first chosen-ciphertext (CC) cache-timing attacks on the reference implementation of HQC. We build a cache-timing based distinguisher for implementing a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle. The PC oracle uses side-channel information to check if a given ciphertext decrypts to a given message. This is done by identifying a vulnerability during the generating process of two vectors in the reference implementation of HQC. We also propose a new method of using PC oracles for chosen-ciphertext side-channel attacks against HQC, which may have independent interest. We show a general proof-of-concept attack, where we use the Flush+Reload technique and also derive, in more detail, a practical attack on an HQC execution on Intel SGX, where the Prime+Probe technique is used. We show the exact path to do key recovery by explaining the detailed steps, using the PC oracle. In both scenarios, the new attack requires 53, 857 traces on average with much fewer PC oracle calls than the timing attack of Guo et al. CHES 2022 on an HQC implementation.</p>}}, author = {{Huang, Senyang and Sim, Rui Qi and Chuengsatiansup, Chitchanok and Guo, Qian and Johansson, Thomas}}, issn = {{2569-2925}}, keywords = {{Code-based cryptography; HQC; NIST PQC standardization; Side-channel attacks}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{136--163}}, publisher = {{Ruhr-University of Bochum}}, series = {{IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}}, title = {{Cache-Timing Attack Against HQC}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2023.i3.136-163}}, doi = {{10.46586/tches.v2023.i3.136-163}}, volume = {{2023}}, year = {{2023}}, }