Insurance strategic considerations in coalition-oriented systems : A consideration set model approach
(2019) In Electoral Studies 57. p.302-308- Abstract
During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold in order to elect a winning coalition (”insurance”). Our argument is that these types of strategic considerations occur already in the campaign, but do not always translate into choice. Using the so-called consideration set model approach (CSM), which focuses on how voters select fewer alternatives among a larger number of parties, we model vote choice over an election campaign using... (More)
During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold in order to elect a winning coalition (”insurance”). Our argument is that these types of strategic considerations occur already in the campaign, but do not always translate into choice. Using the so-called consideration set model approach (CSM), which focuses on how voters select fewer alternatives among a larger number of parties, we model vote choice over an election campaign using panel data from the Swedish National Election Studies of 2014. In line with our argument, we demonstrate that the insurance strategy was prevalent earlier in the decision-making process, when forming the consideration set.
(Less)
- author
- Fredén, Annika LU and Sohlberg, Jacob
- publishing date
- 2019-02
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Coalitions, Consideration set, Insurance, Small parties, Strategic
- in
- Electoral Studies
- volume
- 57
- pages
- 7 pages
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85053734320
- ISSN
- 0261-3794
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.008
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 2018
- id
- 7e13429d-ba6b-45ba-a11f-ca34a64f166e
- date added to LUP
- 2021-12-15 13:44:12
- date last changed
- 2022-04-19 18:56:05
@article{7e13429d-ba6b-45ba-a11f-ca34a64f166e,
abstract = {{<p>During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold in order to elect a winning coalition (”insurance”). Our argument is that these types of strategic considerations occur already in the campaign, but do not always translate into choice. Using the so-called consideration set model approach (CSM), which focuses on how voters select fewer alternatives among a larger number of parties, we model vote choice over an election campaign using panel data from the Swedish National Election Studies of 2014. In line with our argument, we demonstrate that the insurance strategy was prevalent earlier in the decision-making process, when forming the consideration set.</p>}},
author = {{Fredén, Annika and Sohlberg, Jacob}},
issn = {{0261-3794}},
keywords = {{Coalitions; Consideration set; Insurance; Small parties; Strategic}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{302--308}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Electoral Studies}},
title = {{Insurance strategic considerations in coalition-oriented systems : A consideration set model approach}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.008}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.008}},
volume = {{57}},
year = {{2019}},
}