Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion
(2022) In Nous 56(4). p.897-919- Abstract
Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse-grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a potentially infinite set of degrees of approximation to better, worse, and equally good, which we interpret as degrees of commensurability. One payoff is the solution our approach provides to a paradox in population ethics, generated by Parfit's “Continuum Argument”. Parfit imagines a sequence of... (More)
Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse-grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a potentially infinite set of degrees of approximation to better, worse, and equally good, which we interpret as degrees of commensurability. One payoff is the solution our approach provides to a paradox in population ethics, generated by Parfit's “Continuum Argument”. Parfit imagines a sequence of populations, starting with one consisting of excellent lives and, by a sequence of apparent improvements, reaching a much larger population of lives barely worth living. What he dubs “the Repugnant Conclusion” is that the final population is better than the first. Developing Parfit's response, we argue that some of the populations in the sequence are merely almost better than their immediate predecessors. Almost better is not transitive (unlike better). We offer analogies to other ‘spectrum arguments’, Condorcet's paradox, and to developments in formal epistemology.
(Less)
- author
- Hájek, Alan and Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Nous
- volume
- 56
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 897 - 919
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85109081132
- ISSN
- 0029-4624
- DOI
- 10.1111/nous.12388
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 8256dc02-05a6-4419-95ea-993420f6d797
- date added to LUP
- 2021-08-13 14:20:58
- date last changed
- 2023-01-16 10:14:44
@article{8256dc02-05a6-4419-95ea-993420f6d797,
abstract = {{<p>Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse-grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a potentially infinite set of degrees of approximation to better, worse, and equally good, which we interpret as degrees of commensurability. One payoff is the solution our approach provides to a paradox in population ethics, generated by Parfit's “Continuum Argument”. Parfit imagines a sequence of populations, starting with one consisting of excellent lives and, by a sequence of apparent improvements, reaching a much larger population of lives barely worth living. What he dubs “the Repugnant Conclusion” is that the final population is better than the first. Developing Parfit's response, we argue that some of the populations in the sequence are merely almost better than their immediate predecessors. Almost better is not transitive (unlike better). We offer analogies to other ‘spectrum arguments’, Condorcet's paradox, and to developments in formal epistemology.</p>}},
author = {{Hájek, Alan and Rabinowicz, Wlodek}},
issn = {{0029-4624}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{897--919}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Nous}},
title = {{Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12388}},
doi = {{10.1111/nous.12388}},
volume = {{56}},
year = {{2022}},
}