Good, Good For, and Good Relative To : Relative and Relational in Value Theory
(2016) In Philosophy 91(2). p.255-267- Abstract
- This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms... (More)
- This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8568771
- author
- Fritzson, Fritz-Anton LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Philosophy
- volume
- 91
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 255 - 267
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84954214519
- wos:000372068900006
- ISSN
- 0031-8191
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0031819115000558
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 087a8978-3b09-4873-b32e-441d2d977ff3 (old id 8568771)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 11:15:10
- date last changed
- 2022-03-05 02:45:40
@article{087a8978-3b09-4873-b32e-441d2d977ff3,
abstract = {{This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person.}},
author = {{Fritzson, Fritz-Anton}},
issn = {{0031-8191}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{255--267}},
publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
series = {{Philosophy}},
title = {{Good, Good For, and Good Relative To : Relative and Relational in Value Theory}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819115000558}},
doi = {{10.1017/S0031819115000558}},
volume = {{91}},
year = {{2016}},
}