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Good, Good For, and Good Relative To : Relative and Relational in Value Theory

Fritzson, Fritz-Anton LU (2016) In Philosophy 91(2). p.255-267
Abstract
This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms... (More)
This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Philosophy
volume
91
issue
2
pages
255 - 267
publisher
Cambridge University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:84954214519
  • wos:000372068900006
ISSN
0031-8191
DOI
10.1017/S0031819115000558
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
087a8978-3b09-4873-b32e-441d2d977ff3 (old id 8568771)
date added to LUP
2016-01-27 08:05:05
date last changed
2017-01-01 04:17:28
@article{087a8978-3b09-4873-b32e-441d2d977ff3,
  abstract     = {This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person.},
  author       = {Fritzson, Fritz-Anton},
  issn         = {0031-8191},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {255--267},
  publisher    = {Cambridge University Press},
  series       = {Philosophy},
  title        = {Good, Good For, and Good Relative To : Relative and Relational in Value Theory},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819115000558},
  volume       = {91},
  year         = {2016},
}