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Vague Disagreements : Vagueness Without Arbitrary Stipulation

Magnell, Elsa LU orcid (2024) In Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38(3-4). p.157-166
Abstract
According to Ruth Chang (2002, 2022), incommensurability in hard cases cannot be cases of vagueness. This is because vagueness, unlike hard cases, can always be resolved by arbitrary stipulation, leaving no resolutional remainder or substantive disagreement. Contrary to this, I argue that Chang’s argument fails because proponents of the vagueness view are in no way necessarily committed to the claim that vagueness always can be resolved by arbitrary stipulation. In fact, there seems to be no reason to assume that vagueness could not accommodate our intuitions about resolutional remainder and substantive disagreements in a satisfying way. If we want a simple theory, and if at least some incommensurability is vagueness, this could then be a... (More)
According to Ruth Chang (2002, 2022), incommensurability in hard cases cannot be cases of vagueness. This is because vagueness, unlike hard cases, can always be resolved by arbitrary stipulation, leaving no resolutional remainder or substantive disagreement. Contrary to this, I argue that Chang’s argument fails because proponents of the vagueness view are in no way necessarily committed to the claim that vagueness always can be resolved by arbitrary stipulation. In fact, there seems to be no reason to assume that vagueness could not accommodate our intuitions about resolutional remainder and substantive disagreements in a satisfying way. If we want a simple theory, and if at least some incommensurability is vagueness, this could then be a reason for understanding incommensurability as vagueness; and perhaps even rejecting parity. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy
volume
38
issue
3-4
pages
157 - 166
publisher
De Gruyter
ISSN
2750-977X
DOI
10.1515/krt-2024-0016
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
8692761e-c895-4260-a478-106ad5b2c626
date added to LUP
2024-12-12 11:40:58
date last changed
2025-04-04 15:24:04
@article{8692761e-c895-4260-a478-106ad5b2c626,
  abstract     = {{According to Ruth Chang (2002, 2022), incommensurability in hard cases cannot be cases of vagueness. This is because vagueness, unlike hard cases, can always be resolved by arbitrary stipulation, leaving no resolutional remainder or substantive disagreement. Contrary to this, I argue that Chang’s argument fails because proponents of the vagueness view are in no way necessarily committed to the claim that vagueness always can be resolved by arbitrary stipulation. In fact, there seems to be no reason to assume that vagueness could not accommodate our intuitions about resolutional remainder and substantive disagreements in a satisfying way. If we want a simple theory, and if at least some incommensurability is vagueness, this could then be a reason for understanding incommensurability as vagueness; and perhaps even rejecting parity.}},
  author       = {{Magnell, Elsa}},
  issn         = {{2750-977X}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{3-4}},
  pages        = {{157--166}},
  publisher    = {{De Gruyter}},
  series       = {{Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy}},
  title        = {{Vague Disagreements : Vagueness Without Arbitrary Stipulation}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2024-0016}},
  doi          = {{10.1515/krt-2024-0016}},
  volume       = {{38}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}