Advanced

Self-doubt: Why we are not identical to things of any kind

Persson, Ingmar LU (2004) In Ratio 17(4). p.390-408
Abstract
There are two fundamental aspects of the notion of a self: (i) it is the owner of one's experiences, that to which one's experiences are properly attributed, and (ii) it perceives itself. (ii) is a condition on the self's being capable of attributing experiences to itself or being introspectively aware of its experiences, which constitutes a third, higher-order aspect of the self. I claim that it is a common sense assumption, enshrined in the use of 'I', that one's body satisfies the first two aspects. I then argue that these two aspects are not really satisfied by one's body, which is essentially a human organism. Nor are they satisfied by anything of any other kind. So we are not identical to things of any kind, since one can be... (More)
There are two fundamental aspects of the notion of a self: (i) it is the owner of one's experiences, that to which one's experiences are properly attributed, and (ii) it perceives itself. (ii) is a condition on the self's being capable of attributing experiences to itself or being introspectively aware of its experiences, which constitutes a third, higher-order aspect of the self. I claim that it is a common sense assumption, enshrined in the use of 'I', that one's body satisfies the first two aspects. I then argue that these two aspects are not really satisfied by one's body, which is essentially a human organism. Nor are they satisfied by anything of any other kind. So we are not identical to things of any kind, since one can be identical only to that which is one's self or is the referent of one's uses of, 'I'. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Ratio
volume
17
issue
4
pages
390 - 408
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • wos:000225644600002
  • scopus:60949137110
ISSN
0034-0006
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00262.x
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
564e1a6e-5078-47bd-aafa-7ae1e655cac1 (old id 895544)
date added to LUP
2008-01-18 11:02:11
date last changed
2017-01-01 06:56:47
@article{564e1a6e-5078-47bd-aafa-7ae1e655cac1,
  abstract     = {There are two fundamental aspects of the notion of a self: (i) it is the owner of one's experiences, that to which one's experiences are properly attributed, and (ii) it perceives itself. (ii) is a condition on the self's being capable of attributing experiences to itself or being introspectively aware of its experiences, which constitutes a third, higher-order aspect of the self. I claim that it is a common sense assumption, enshrined in the use of 'I', that one's body satisfies the first two aspects. I then argue that these two aspects are not really satisfied by one's body, which is essentially a human organism. Nor are they satisfied by anything of any other kind. So we are not identical to things of any kind, since one can be identical only to that which is one's self or is the referent of one's uses of, 'I'.},
  author       = {Persson, Ingmar},
  issn         = {0034-0006},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {390--408},
  publisher    = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  series       = {Ratio},
  title        = {Self-doubt: Why we are not identical to things of any kind},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00262.x},
  volume       = {17},
  year         = {2004},
}