Invariant Equivocation
(2016) In Erkenntnis Abstract
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agentdependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates... (More)
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agentdependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton’s original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence.
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 author
 Landes, Jürgen and Masterton, George ^{LU}
 organization
 publishing date
 20160418
 type
 Contribution to journal
 publication status
 epub
 subject
 in
 Erkenntnis
 pages
 27 pages
 publisher
 Springer
 external identifiers

 Scopus:84964336877
 ISSN
 01650106
 DOI
 10.1007/s1067001698101
 language
 English
 LU publication?
 yes
 id
 8f3f31f6c1824beea5ee4c44cb5794ab
 date added to LUP
 20160930 14:40:32
 date last changed
 20170101 08:35:38
@article{8f3f31f6c1824beea5ee4c44cb5794ab, abstract = {<p>Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agentdependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton’s original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence.</p>}, author = {Landes, Jürgen and Masterton, George}, issn = {01650106}, language = {eng}, month = {04}, pages = {27}, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Erkenntnis}, title = {Invariant Equivocation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1067001698101}, year = {2016}, }