The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear
(2023) In Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53(3). p.209-223- Abstract
- I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/9000870a-4609-465c-905c-091ae1aa3e19
- author
- Palmqvist, Carl-Johan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023-04
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Hope, Fear, Epistemic Possibility, Desire, Mirror Account
- in
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- volume
- 53
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 15 pages
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85190152877
- ISSN
- 1911-0820
- DOI
- 10.1017/can.2024.2
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9000870a-4609-465c-905c-091ae1aa3e19
- date added to LUP
- 2024-02-23 12:00:56
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:18:11
@article{9000870a-4609-465c-905c-091ae1aa3e19,
abstract = {{I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states.}},
author = {{Palmqvist, Carl-Johan}},
issn = {{1911-0820}},
keywords = {{Hope; Fear; Epistemic Possibility; Desire; Mirror Account}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{209--223}},
publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}},
series = {{Canadian Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2024.2}},
doi = {{10.1017/can.2024.2}},
volume = {{53}},
year = {{2023}},
}