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Regulating Multiple Externalities: The Case of Nordic Fisheries

Waldo, Staffan LU ; Nielsen, Max ; Jensen, Frank ; Ellefsen, Hans ; Hallgrimsson, Jònas ; Hammarlund, Cecilia LU ; Hermansson, Oystein and Isaksen, John (2016) In Marine Resource Economics 31(2). p.233-257
Abstract
Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces... (More)
Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces... (More)
Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; ; ; ; ; ; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Climate change, economic efficiency, externalities, regulation, fisheries, fuel efficiency, Q22, Q54
in
Marine Resource Economics
volume
31
issue
2
pages
25 pages
publisher
University of Chicago Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:84964845688
  • wos:000372670400007
ISSN
0738-1360
DOI
10.1086/685286
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
9003bc45-3908-4f1c-8817-11785afb4555
date added to LUP
2016-09-02 13:07:27
date last changed
2025-04-04 14:23:32
@article{9003bc45-3908-4f1c-8817-11785afb4555,
  abstract     = {{Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.}},
  author       = {{Waldo, Staffan and Nielsen, Max and Jensen, Frank and Ellefsen, Hans and Hallgrimsson, Jònas and Hammarlund, Cecilia and Hermansson, Oystein and Isaksen, John}},
  issn         = {{0738-1360}},
  keywords     = {{Climate change; economic efficiency; externalities; regulation; fisheries; fuel efficiency; Q22; Q54}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{04}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{233--257}},
  publisher    = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  series       = {{Marine Resource Economics}},
  title        = {{Regulating Multiple Externalities: The Case of Nordic Fisheries}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/685286}},
  doi          = {{10.1086/685286}},
  volume       = {{31}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}