Neither Fish, Nor Fowl : A New Way to a Fuller Understanding of the lex specialis Principle
(2023) In International Community Law Review 25(5). p.426-455- Abstract
International lawyers ascribe to the lex specialis principle three distinctly different meanings. Thus, lex specialis is referred to, first, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts between entire categories of norms; secondly, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis; and, thirdly, as a rule of interpretation designed to avoid the occurrence of normative conflicts, rather than to resolve them. Scholars have attempted to explain this divergent use of legal language. In so doing, they have consistently had their focus on the different mind-sets or inclinations of lawyers active in different branches of international law. Symptomatic is Marko Milanović, who pictured the divergent use of lex specialis as a reflection... (More)
International lawyers ascribe to the lex specialis principle three distinctly different meanings. Thus, lex specialis is referred to, first, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts between entire categories of norms; secondly, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis; and, thirdly, as a rule of interpretation designed to avoid the occurrence of normative conflicts, rather than to resolve them. Scholars have attempted to explain this divergent use of legal language. In so doing, they have consistently had their focus on the different mind-sets or inclinations of lawyers active in different branches of international law. Symptomatic is Marko Milanović, who pictured the divergent use of lex specialis as a reflection of a debate waged between "human rights enthusiasts"and "human rights sceptics". This article approaches the issue at a different level of abstraction. As it argues, the divergent use of lex specialis is the result of users' different conceptions of an international legal system. Thus, lawyers conceive differently of the lex specialis principle, depending on whether they take the position of a legal positivist, a legal idealist or a legal realist. In no case are lawyers equipped to conceive of this principle in all of its three senses.
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- author
- Linderfalk, Ulf LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- conflict of norms, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international law, lex specialis
- in
- International Community Law Review
- volume
- 25
- issue
- 5
- pages
- 426 - 455
- publisher
- Brill
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85146779904
- ISSN
- 1871-9740
- DOI
- 10.1163/18719732-bja10097
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9376b4a4-fb2b-445a-aac3-ea1df9d7139f
- date added to LUP
- 2023-02-13 13:39:28
- date last changed
- 2023-10-26 14:51:48
@article{9376b4a4-fb2b-445a-aac3-ea1df9d7139f,
abstract = {{<p>International lawyers ascribe to the lex specialis principle three distinctly different meanings. Thus, lex specialis is referred to, first, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts between entire categories of norms; secondly, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis; and, thirdly, as a rule of interpretation designed to avoid the occurrence of normative conflicts, rather than to resolve them. Scholars have attempted to explain this divergent use of legal language. In so doing, they have consistently had their focus on the different mind-sets or inclinations of lawyers active in different branches of international law. Symptomatic is Marko Milanović, who pictured the divergent use of lex specialis as a reflection of a debate waged between "human rights enthusiasts"and "human rights sceptics". This article approaches the issue at a different level of abstraction. As it argues, the divergent use of lex specialis is the result of users' different conceptions of an international legal system. Thus, lawyers conceive differently of the lex specialis principle, depending on whether they take the position of a legal positivist, a legal idealist or a legal realist. In no case are lawyers equipped to conceive of this principle in all of its three senses.</p>}},
author = {{Linderfalk, Ulf}},
issn = {{1871-9740}},
keywords = {{conflict of norms; international human rights law; international humanitarian law; international law; lex specialis}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{5}},
pages = {{426--455}},
publisher = {{Brill}},
series = {{International Community Law Review}},
title = {{Neither Fish, Nor Fowl : A New Way to a Fuller Understanding of the lex specialis Principle}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18719732-bja10097}},
doi = {{10.1163/18719732-bja10097}},
volume = {{25}},
year = {{2023}},
}