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The defeasible nature of coherentist justification

Angere, Staffan LU (2007) In Synthese 157(3). p.321-335
Abstract
The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of... (More)
The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
defeasible justification, measure theory, Coherence
in
Synthese
volume
157
issue
3
pages
321 - 335
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:34547522465
ISSN
0039-7857
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
7b3b19e3-0273-4de3-8912-f8efb7631608 (old id 950138)
date added to LUP
2008-01-25 08:29:55
date last changed
2017-11-05 04:36:27
@article{7b3b19e3-0273-4de3-8912-f8efb7631608,
  abstract     = {The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification.},
  author       = {Angere, Staffan},
  issn         = {0039-7857},
  keyword      = {defeasible justification,measure theory,Coherence},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {321--335},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Synthese},
  title        = {The defeasible nature of coherentist justification},
  volume       = {157},
  year         = {2007},
}