Advanced

Coherence as a heuristic

Angere, Staffan LU (2008) In Mind 117(465). p.1-26
Abstract
The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from... (More)
The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from each other when more knowledge is added. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Coherence, probabilistic measures
in
Mind
volume
117
issue
465
pages
1 - 26
publisher
Oxford University Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000253674800001
  • scopus:57749141214
ISSN
0026-4423
DOI
10.1093/mind/fzn001
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
c263bf43-45ff-4c7b-a06d-8993ae4c031a (old id 950155)
date added to LUP
2008-01-25 08:29:01
date last changed
2017-04-16 03:55:36
@article{c263bf43-45ff-4c7b-a06d-8993ae4c031a,
  abstract     = {The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from each other when more knowledge is added.},
  author       = {Angere, Staffan},
  issn         = {0026-4423},
  keyword      = {Coherence,probabilistic measures},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {465},
  pages        = {1--26},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  series       = {Mind},
  title        = {Coherence as a heuristic},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn001},
  volume       = {117},
  year         = {2008},
}