Towards an analysis of voting power in parliament: an exploration into coalition-making in Nordic parliaments
(2007) In Acta Politica 42(4). p.355-379- Abstract
- In this explorative paper, coalitions in national assemblies are analysed as n-person games with the Penrose-Banzhaf solution concept. It is shown that forming minority coalitions may result from a rational strategy to maximize voting power. Thus, there is no need to attempt a permanent minimum winning coalition. Moreover, maximizing voting power for a group of players like a disciplined political party involves the making of temporary coalitions over the entire political space, as anything goes. The examples looked at include the present Nordic parliamentary situation in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/968977
- author
- Lane, Jan-Erik and Maeland, Reinert LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- multipartism, Machiavellianism as maximizing voting power, Penrose-Banzhaf approach, Wicksell's unanimity principle, minority coalitions, calculus and interpretation, Nordic parliaments
- in
- Acta Politica
- volume
- 42
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 355 - 379
- publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000251236600001
- scopus:36549074245
- ISSN
- 0001-6810
- DOI
- 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500169
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- a4d7d09c-c1bd-42be-b55b-f883e5728500 (old id 968977)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 17:01:59
- date last changed
- 2022-01-28 23:55:33
@article{a4d7d09c-c1bd-42be-b55b-f883e5728500, abstract = {{In this explorative paper, coalitions in national assemblies are analysed as n-person games with the Penrose-Banzhaf solution concept. It is shown that forming minority coalitions may result from a rational strategy to maximize voting power. Thus, there is no need to attempt a permanent minimum winning coalition. Moreover, maximizing voting power for a group of players like a disciplined political party involves the making of temporary coalitions over the entire political space, as anything goes. The examples looked at include the present Nordic parliamentary situation in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland.}}, author = {{Lane, Jan-Erik and Maeland, Reinert}}, issn = {{0001-6810}}, keywords = {{multipartism; Machiavellianism as maximizing voting power; Penrose-Banzhaf approach; Wicksell's unanimity principle; minority coalitions; calculus and interpretation; Nordic parliaments}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{355--379}}, publisher = {{Palgrave Macmillan}}, series = {{Acta Politica}}, title = {{Towards an analysis of voting power in parliament: an exploration into coalition-making in Nordic parliaments}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500169}}, doi = {{10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500169}}, volume = {{42}}, year = {{2007}}, }