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Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2006) In Philosophical Quarterly 56(222). p.114-120
Abstract
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out... (More)
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Philosophical Quarterly
volume
56
issue
222
pages
114 - 120
publisher
Oxford University Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000235243500008
  • scopus:34548546667
ISSN
0031-8094
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00432.x
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
968cbe5d-dad7-4c10-a657-21020361bffc (old id 693606)
date added to LUP
2007-12-20 14:14:44
date last changed
2017-05-28 03:34:37
@misc{968cbe5d-dad7-4c10-a657-21020361bffc,
  abstract     = {The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble.},
  author       = {Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  issn         = {0031-8094},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {222},
  pages        = {114--120},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  series       = {Philosophical Quarterly},
  title        = {Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00432.x},
  volume       = {56},
  year         = {2006},
}