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Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation

Alm, David LU (2008) In Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2(3).
Abstract
I argue that it is not possible to give an adequate account, within a Scanlon-style contractualist moral theory of the moral duties to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. The problem, very simply put, is that there is no room within such a theory for the fact that the content of these obligations must be proportionate to the value of the actions that bring them into being in the first place. As a consequence, I point to a wider a moral about contractualism. This is that while that doctrine may provide an adequate account of obligations that we have to others on account simply of their status as persons, it cannot handle obligations that arise as a response to actions that these... (More)
I argue that it is not possible to give an adequate account, within a Scanlon-style contractualist moral theory of the moral duties to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. The problem, very simply put, is that there is no room within such a theory for the fact that the content of these obligations must be proportionate to the value of the actions that bring them into being in the first place. As a consequence, I point to a wider a moral about contractualism. This is that while that doctrine may provide an adequate account of obligations that we have to others on account simply of their status as persons, it cannot handle obligations that arise as a response to actions that these others, or we ourselves, have performed. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
volume
2
issue
3
publisher
University of Southern California
ISSN
1559-3061
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a44f3dbe-a684-4d2a-bd39-3a847fc69980 (old id 987832)
alternative location
http://www.jesp.org/articles/download.php?id=29
date added to LUP
2008-11-06 15:48:07
date last changed
2016-04-16 01:51:30
@article{a44f3dbe-a684-4d2a-bd39-3a847fc69980,
  abstract     = {I argue that it is not possible to give an adequate account, within a Scanlon-style contractualist moral theory of the moral duties to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. The problem, very simply put, is that there is no room within such a theory for the fact that the content of these obligations must be proportionate to the value of the actions that bring them into being in the first place. As a consequence, I point to a wider a moral about contractualism. This is that while that doctrine may provide an adequate account of obligations that we have to others on account simply of their status as persons, it cannot handle obligations that arise as a response to actions that these others, or we ourselves, have performed.},
  author       = {Alm, David},
  issn         = {1559-3061},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  publisher    = {University of Southern California},
  series       = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
  title        = {Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation},
  volume       = {2},
  year         = {2008},
}