Blame as a sentiment
(2022) In International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30(3). p.239-253- Abstract
The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a... (More)
The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.
(Less)
- author
- Werkmäster, Marta Johansson LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Blame, disposition, emotion, moral responsibility, sentiment
- in
- International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- volume
- 30
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 15 pages
- publisher
- Routledge
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85141043877
- ISSN
- 0967-2559
- DOI
- 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9cdc2dec-2e01-4d71-b97e-993b3aa730bd
- date added to LUP
- 2022-12-21 15:06:17
- date last changed
- 2022-12-21 15:06:17
@article{9cdc2dec-2e01-4d71-b97e-993b3aa730bd,
abstract = {{<p>The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.</p>}},
author = {{Werkmäster, Marta Johansson}},
issn = {{0967-2559}},
keywords = {{Blame; disposition; emotion; moral responsibility; sentiment}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{239--253}},
publisher = {{Routledge}},
series = {{International Journal of Philosophical Studies}},
title = {{Blame as a sentiment}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893}},
doi = {{10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893}},
volume = {{30}},
year = {{2022}},
}