The Simplest Multi-key Linearly Homomorphic Signature Scheme
(2019) 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, LATINCRYPT 2019 In Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11774. p.280-300- Abstract
- We consider the problem of outsourcing computation on data authenticated by different users. Our aim is to describe and implement the simplest possible solution to provide data integrity in cloud-based scenarios. Concretely, our multi-key linearly homomorphic signature scheme (MKLHS) allows users to upload signed data on a server, and at any later point in time any third party can query the server to compute a linear combination of data authenticated by different users and check the correctness of the returned result. Our construction generalizes Boneh et al.’s linearly homomorphic signature scheme (PKC’09 [7]) to the multi-key setting and relies on basic tools of pairing-based cryptography. Compared to existing multi-key homomorphic... (More)
- We consider the problem of outsourcing computation on data authenticated by different users. Our aim is to describe and implement the simplest possible solution to provide data integrity in cloud-based scenarios. Concretely, our multi-key linearly homomorphic signature scheme (MKLHS) allows users to upload signed data on a server, and at any later point in time any third party can query the server to compute a linear combination of data authenticated by different users and check the correctness of the returned result. Our construction generalizes Boneh et al.’s linearly homomorphic signature scheme (PKC’09 [7]) to the multi-key setting and relies on basic tools of pairing-based cryptography. Compared to existing multi-key homomorphic signature schemes, our MKLHS is a conceptually simple and elegant direct construction, which trades-off privacy for efficiency. The simplicity of our approach leads us to a very efficient construction that enjoys significantly shorter signatures and higher performance than previous proposals. Finally, we implement MKLHS using two different pairing-friendly curves at the 128-bit security level, a Barreto-Lynn-Scott curve and a Barreto-Naehrig curve. Our benchmarks illustrate interesting performance trade-offs between these parameters, involving the cost of exponentiation and hashing in pairing groups. We provide a discussion on such trade-offs that can be useful to other implementers of pairing-based protocols. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/9d083f99-b476-4532-bc05-bd083177fb80
- author
- Aranha, Diego and Pagnin, Elena LU
- publishing date
- 2019-09-09
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Multi-key homomorphic signatures, Cryptographic pairings, Efficient software implementation
- host publication
- Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 : 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Santiago de Chile, Chile, October 2–4, 2019, Proceedings - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Santiago de Chile, Chile, October 2–4, 2019, Proceedings
- series title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- editor
- Schwabe, Peter and Thériault, Nicolas
- volume
- 11774
- pages
- 280 - 300
- publisher
- Springer
- conference name
- 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, LATINCRYPT 2019
- conference location
- Santiago de Chile, Chile
- conference dates
- 2019-10-02 - 2019-10-04
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85072867595
- ISSN
- 1611-3349
- 0302-9743
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-30529-1
- 978-3-030-30530-7
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_14
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 9d083f99-b476-4532-bc05-bd083177fb80
- date added to LUP
- 2021-01-26 15:04:36
- date last changed
- 2024-07-25 11:05:28
@inproceedings{9d083f99-b476-4532-bc05-bd083177fb80, abstract = {{We consider the problem of outsourcing computation on data authenticated by different users. Our aim is to describe and implement the simplest possible solution to provide data integrity in cloud-based scenarios. Concretely, our multi-key linearly homomorphic signature scheme (MKLHS) allows users to upload signed data on a server, and at any later point in time any third party can query the server to compute a linear combination of data authenticated by different users and check the correctness of the returned result. Our construction generalizes Boneh et al.’s linearly homomorphic signature scheme (PKC’09 [7]) to the multi-key setting and relies on basic tools of pairing-based cryptography. Compared to existing multi-key homomorphic signature schemes, our MKLHS is a conceptually simple and elegant direct construction, which trades-off privacy for efficiency. The simplicity of our approach leads us to a very efficient construction that enjoys significantly shorter signatures and higher performance than previous proposals. Finally, we implement MKLHS using two different pairing-friendly curves at the 128-bit security level, a Barreto-Lynn-Scott curve and a Barreto-Naehrig curve. Our benchmarks illustrate interesting performance trade-offs between these parameters, involving the cost of exponentiation and hashing in pairing groups. We provide a discussion on such trade-offs that can be useful to other implementers of pairing-based protocols.}}, author = {{Aranha, Diego and Pagnin, Elena}}, booktitle = {{Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 : 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Santiago de Chile, Chile, October 2–4, 2019, Proceedings}}, editor = {{Schwabe, Peter and Thériault, Nicolas}}, isbn = {{978-3-030-30529-1}}, issn = {{1611-3349}}, keywords = {{Multi-key homomorphic signatures; Cryptographic pairings; Efficient software implementation}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{09}}, pages = {{280--300}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}}, title = {{The Simplest Multi-key Linearly Homomorphic Signature Scheme}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_14}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_14}}, volume = {{11774}}, year = {{2019}}, }