“True Religion” and Hume’s Practical Atheism
(2020) In International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées 233. p.191-225- Abstract
- The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion . Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion ”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both these proposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form... (More)
- The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion . Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion ”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both these proposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form of atheism that Hume defends has a more modest and realistic aim, which is simply to restrict and limit the most pernicious forms of religion . Understood this way, Hume’s practical atheism is very different from the forms of “old” atheism associated with Spinoza and D’Holbach, as well as from the “new atheism” of thinkers such as Dawkins and Dennett.
And though the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however, true, which he must confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.
Hume, EM, 9. 14/ 279
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- author
- Russell, Paul LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought : A New Pan-American Dialogue - A New Pan-American Dialogue
- series title
- International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées
- editor
- Rosaleny, Vicente Raga and Smith, Plínio Junqueira
- volume
- 233
- pages
- 191 - 225
- publisher
- Springer
- ISSN
- 2215-0307
- 0066-6610
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-55362-3
- 978-3-030-55361-6
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-55362-3_12
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9dff06d4-e4f7-4bbc-8044-2a8c21af3616
- date added to LUP
- 2024-09-14 09:01:22
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 15:28:35
@inbook{9dff06d4-e4f7-4bbc-8044-2a8c21af3616,
abstract = {{The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion . Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion ”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both these proposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form of atheism that Hume defends has a more modest and realistic aim, which is simply to restrict and limit the most pernicious forms of religion . Understood this way, Hume’s practical atheism is very different from the forms of “old” atheism associated with Spinoza and D’Holbach, as well as from the “new atheism” of thinkers such as Dawkins and Dennett.<br/><br/>And though the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however, true, which he must confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.<br/>Hume, EM, 9. 14/ 279<br/>}},
author = {{Russell, Paul}},
booktitle = {{Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought : A New Pan-American Dialogue}},
editor = {{Rosaleny, Vicente Raga and Smith, Plínio Junqueira}},
isbn = {{978-3-030-55362-3}},
issn = {{2215-0307}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{191--225}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées}},
title = {{“True Religion” and Hume’s Practical Atheism}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55362-3_12}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-55362-3_12}},
volume = {{233}},
year = {{2020}},
}