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What about the non-legal facts : Revising Allen and Pardo’s analytical distinction between law and fact

Sevelin, Ellika LU (2019) In International Journal of Evidence and Proof p.1-17
Abstract
This paper deals with the distinction between law and fact. In the article ‘The myth of the law-fact distinction’ (Allen and Pardo, 2003a), Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo argue that there is no ontological, epistemological or analytical distinction between law and fact. Instead, they claim that the distinction ought to be understood pragmatically, by considering whether the judge or jury is in the best position to decide the question. The problem with this is that it does not add to the understanding. In a soon-forgotten passus they suggest that the distinction is between legal and non-legal facts, rather than between law and fact. In this paper I revise the article by Ron and Pardo and make an argument in favour of the distinction between... (More)
This paper deals with the distinction between law and fact. In the article ‘The myth of the law-fact distinction’ (Allen and Pardo, 2003a), Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo argue that there is no ontological, epistemological or analytical distinction between law and fact. Instead, they claim that the distinction ought to be understood pragmatically, by considering whether the judge or jury is in the best position to decide the question. The problem with this is that it does not add to the understanding. In a soon-forgotten passus they suggest that the distinction is between legal and non-legal facts, rather than between law and fact. In this paper I revise the article by Ron and Pardo and make an argument in favour of the distinction between legal and non-legal facts. The notion of ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’ underlines the fact that the dichotomy is relevant specifically from a legal point of view. In the legal context different consequences apply to law and fact, the same is not true in a non-legal context. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
Civil and criminal procedure, Processrätt
in
International Journal of Evidence and Proof
pages
18 pages
external identifiers
  • scopus:85067845828
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a0dcb7ab-59be-42ef-a88d-2cb5bc6d6549
date added to LUP
2019-06-18 14:27:06
date last changed
2019-07-30 05:04:03
@article{a0dcb7ab-59be-42ef-a88d-2cb5bc6d6549,
  abstract     = {This paper deals with the distinction between law and fact. In the article ‘The myth of the law-fact distinction’ (Allen and Pardo, 2003a), Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo argue that there is no ontological, epistemological or analytical distinction between law and fact. Instead, they claim that the distinction ought to be understood pragmatically, by considering whether the judge or jury is in the best position to decide the question. The problem with this is that it does not add to the understanding. In a soon-forgotten passus they suggest that the distinction is between legal and non-legal facts, rather than between law and fact. In this paper I revise the article by Ron and Pardo and make an argument in favour of the distinction between legal and non-legal facts. The notion of ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’ underlines the fact that the dichotomy is relevant specifically from a legal point of view. In the legal context different consequences apply to law and fact, the same is not true in a non-legal context.},
  author       = {Sevelin, Ellika},
  keyword      = {Civil and criminal procedure,Processrätt},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {1--17},
  series       = {International Journal of Evidence and Proof},
  title        = {What about the non-legal facts : Revising Allen and Pardo’s analytical distinction between law and fact},
  year         = {2019},
}