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Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved?

Ask Zaar, Balder Edmund (2021) In Theoria (Sweden) 87(6). p.1609-1634
Abstract

In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but nonetheless fail to entail a corresponding belief. If either of these approaches were successful, it would potentially be damaging for Williamson's theory of knowledge. I argue that recent arguments that exemplify these approaches are unconvincing.

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author
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
analysability, counterexamples, factive mental state operators, factive mental states, FMSO, Knowledge, Timothy Williamson
in
Theoria (Sweden)
volume
87
issue
6
pages
26 pages
publisher
Thales
external identifiers
  • scopus:85118881481
ISSN
0040-5825
DOI
10.1111/theo.12369
language
English
LU publication?
no
additional info
Publisher Copyright: © 2021 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria.
id
a39e7162-0c5c-4c80-8921-1be5fbc787fb
date added to LUP
2021-12-02 15:42:13
date last changed
2022-04-27 06:16:47
@article{a39e7162-0c5c-4c80-8921-1be5fbc787fb,
  abstract     = {{<p>In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but nonetheless fail to entail a corresponding belief. If either of these approaches were successful, it would potentially be damaging for Williamson's theory of knowledge. I argue that recent arguments that exemplify these approaches are unconvincing.</p>}},
  author       = {{Ask Zaar, Balder Edmund}},
  issn         = {{0040-5825}},
  keywords     = {{analysability; counterexamples; factive mental state operators; factive mental states; FMSO; Knowledge; Timothy Williamson}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{12}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{1609--1634}},
  publisher    = {{Thales}},
  series       = {{Theoria (Sweden)}},
  title        = {{Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved?}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.12369}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/theo.12369}},
  volume       = {{87}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}