Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved?
(2021) In Theoria (Sweden) 87(6). p.1609-1634- Abstract
In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but nonetheless fail to entail a corresponding belief. If either of these approaches were successful, it would potentially be damaging for Williamson's theory of knowledge. I argue that recent arguments that exemplify these approaches are unconvincing.
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https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/a39e7162-0c5c-4c80-8921-1be5fbc787fb
- author
- Ask Zaar, Balder Edmund LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2021
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- analysability, counterexamples, factive mental state operators, factive mental states, FMSO, Knowledge, Timothy Williamson
- in
- Theoria (Sweden)
- volume
- 87
- issue
- 6
- pages
- 26 pages
- publisher
- Thales
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85118881481
- ISSN
- 0040-5825
- DOI
- 10.1111/theo.12369
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- a39e7162-0c5c-4c80-8921-1be5fbc787fb
- date added to LUP
- 2021-12-02 15:42:13
- date last changed
- 2024-09-18 08:14:14
@article{a39e7162-0c5c-4c80-8921-1be5fbc787fb, abstract = {{<p>In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but nonetheless fail to entail a corresponding belief. If either of these approaches were successful, it would potentially be damaging for Williamson's theory of knowledge. I argue that recent arguments that exemplify these approaches are unconvincing.</p>}}, author = {{Ask Zaar, Balder Edmund}}, issn = {{0040-5825}}, keywords = {{analysability; counterexamples; factive mental state operators; factive mental states; FMSO; Knowledge; Timothy Williamson}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1609--1634}}, publisher = {{Thales}}, series = {{Theoria (Sweden)}}, title = {{Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved?}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.12369}}, doi = {{10.1111/theo.12369}}, volume = {{87}}, year = {{2021}}, }