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Goodness and Numbers

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU (2023) p.355-381
Abstract
You can save either David or Peter and Mary. Is there a compelling reason for saving the greater number? Taurek (1977) (in)famously denied it. In providing such reason one might attempt to establish that it is better if more people survive rather than fewer. This would settle the issue for consequentialists, but even non-consequentialists might find it relevant to the question at hand. The standard worry, however, is that such an axiological claim can only be established by aggregating gains and losses of different persons. As opposed to intrapersonal aggregation, interpersonal aggregation might seem illegitimate. Frances Kamm's Aggregation Argument is meant to overcome this difficulty. I consider how her argument is dealt with by Iwao... (More)
You can save either David or Peter and Mary. Is there a compelling reason for saving the greater number? Taurek (1977) (in)famously denied it. In providing such reason one might attempt to establish that it is better if more people survive rather than fewer. This would settle the issue for consequentialists, but even non-consequentialists might find it relevant to the question at hand. The standard worry, however, is that such an axiological claim can only be established by aggregating gains and losses of different persons. As opposed to intrapersonal aggregation, interpersonal aggregation might seem illegitimate. Frances Kamm's Aggregation Argument is meant to overcome this difficulty. I consider how her argument is dealt with by Iwao Hirose, Weyma Lubbe and Rob Lawlor, and what is wrong with it from Taurek's own perspective. But then I suggest that this perspective is untenable: While Taurek correctly analyses the concept of 'better' in term of fitting preferences, he accunts for fittingness appealing to the wrong kind of reasons. Still, even so, Kamm's argument fails, but a closely related argument may well be acceptable. Unlike the former, that argument recognizes that different ordinary lives typically are on a par; they seldom are equally good. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
host publication
Value, Morality and Social Reality : Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
editor
Garcia, Andrés G. ; Gunnemyr, Mattias and Werkmäster, Jakob
pages
27 pages
publisher
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
ISBN
978-91-89415-65-2
978-91-89415-66-9
DOI
10.37852/oblu.189.c533
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a472ad4d-e8a7-41e5-b3ff-55d9c51f86fc
date added to LUP
2023-10-23 21:52:39
date last changed
2023-10-26 12:27:17
@inbook{a472ad4d-e8a7-41e5-b3ff-55d9c51f86fc,
  abstract     = {{You can save either David or Peter and Mary. Is there a compelling reason for saving the greater number? Taurek (1977) (in)famously denied it. In providing such reason one might attempt to establish that it is better if more people survive rather than fewer. This would settle the issue for consequentialists, but even non-consequentialists might find it relevant to the question at hand. The standard worry, however, is that such an axiological claim can only be established by aggregating gains and losses of different persons. As opposed to intrapersonal aggregation, interpersonal aggregation might seem illegitimate. Frances Kamm's Aggregation Argument is meant to overcome this difficulty. I consider how her argument is dealt with by Iwao Hirose, Weyma Lubbe and Rob Lawlor, and what is wrong with it from Taurek's own perspective. But then I suggest that this perspective is untenable: While Taurek correctly analyses the concept of 'better' in term of fitting preferences, he accunts for fittingness appealing to the wrong kind of reasons. Still, even so, Kamm's argument fails, but a closely related argument may well be acceptable. Unlike the former, that argument recognizes that different ordinary lives typically are on a par; they seldom are equally good.}},
  author       = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek}},
  booktitle    = {{Value, Morality and Social Reality : Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen}},
  editor       = {{Garcia, Andrés G. and Gunnemyr, Mattias and Werkmäster, Jakob}},
  isbn         = {{978-91-89415-65-2}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{355--381}},
  publisher    = {{Department of Philosophy, Lund University}},
  title        = {{Goodness and Numbers}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.37852/oblu.189.c533}},
  doi          = {{10.37852/oblu.189.c533}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}