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Properties: Qualities, Powers, or Both?

Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur LU (2013) In Dialectica 67(1). p.55-80
Abstract
Powers are popularly assumed to be distinct from, and dependent upon, inert qualities, mainly because it is believed that qualities have their nature independently of other properties while powers have their nature in virtue of a relation to distinct manifestation property. George Molnar and Alexander Bird, on the other hand, characterise powers as intrinsic and relational. The difficulties of reconciling the characteristics of being intrinsic and at the same time essentially related are illustrated in this paper and it is argued that the reasons for thinking of powers as essentially relational are based on misguided epistemological consideration. Finally, I present a way of thinking of fundamental properties as primitive natures that we... (More)
Powers are popularly assumed to be distinct from, and dependent upon, inert qualities, mainly because it is believed that qualities have their nature independently of other properties while powers have their nature in virtue of a relation to distinct manifestation property. George Molnar and Alexander Bird, on the other hand, characterise powers as intrinsic and relational. The difficulties of reconciling the characteristics of being intrinsic and at the same time essentially related are illustrated in this paper and it is argued that the reasons for thinking of powers as essentially relational are based on misguided epistemological consideration. Finally, I present a way of thinking of fundamental properties as primitive natures that we can only understand in virtue of what they do but which we should not think of as being ontologically constituted by these doings. According to this view, properties are both qualities and powers. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Metaphysics, Properties, Powers, Qualities, Categorical/Dispositional Distinction
in
Dialectica
volume
67
issue
1
pages
55 - 80
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • wos:000318163400003
  • other:DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12011
  • scopus:84876748824
ISSN
1746-8361
DOI
10.1111/1746-8361.12011
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a9220c3f-a7dc-463a-a1c7-164421b712c2 (old id 3616061)
date added to LUP
2013-04-11 11:20:49
date last changed
2018-05-29 10:01:34
@article{a9220c3f-a7dc-463a-a1c7-164421b712c2,
  abstract     = {Powers are popularly assumed to be distinct from, and dependent upon, inert qualities, mainly because it is believed that qualities have their nature independently of other properties while powers have their nature in virtue of a relation to distinct manifestation property. George Molnar and Alexander Bird, on the other hand, characterise powers as intrinsic and relational. The difficulties of reconciling the characteristics of being intrinsic and at the same time essentially related are illustrated in this paper and it is argued that the reasons for thinking of powers as essentially relational are based on misguided epistemological consideration. Finally, I present a way of thinking of fundamental properties as primitive natures that we can only understand in virtue of what they do but which we should not think of as being ontologically constituted by these doings. According to this view, properties are both qualities and powers.},
  author       = {Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur},
  issn         = {1746-8361},
  keyword      = {Metaphysics,Properties,Powers,Qualities,Categorical/Dispositional Distinction},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {55--80},
  publisher    = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  series       = {Dialectica},
  title        = {Properties: Qualities, Powers, or Both?},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12011},
  volume       = {67},
  year         = {2013},
}