Properties: Qualities, Powers, or Both?
(2013) In Dialectica 67(1). p.55-80- Abstract
- Powers are popularly assumed to be distinct from, and dependent upon, inert qualities, mainly because it is believed that qualities have their nature independently of other properties while powers have their nature in virtue of a relation to distinct manifestation property. George Molnar and Alexander Bird, on the other hand, characterise powers as intrinsic and relational. The difficulties of reconciling the characteristics of being intrinsic and at the same time essentially related are illustrated in this paper and it is argued that the reasons for thinking of powers as essentially relational are based on misguided epistemological consideration. Finally, I present a way of thinking of fundamental properties as primitive natures that we... (More)
- Powers are popularly assumed to be distinct from, and dependent upon, inert qualities, mainly because it is believed that qualities have their nature independently of other properties while powers have their nature in virtue of a relation to distinct manifestation property. George Molnar and Alexander Bird, on the other hand, characterise powers as intrinsic and relational. The difficulties of reconciling the characteristics of being intrinsic and at the same time essentially related are illustrated in this paper and it is argued that the reasons for thinking of powers as essentially relational are based on misguided epistemological consideration. Finally, I present a way of thinking of fundamental properties as primitive natures that we can only understand in virtue of what they do but which we should not think of as being ontologically constituted by these doings. According to this view, properties are both qualities and powers. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3616061
- author
- Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Metaphysics, Properties, Powers, Qualities, Categorical/Dispositional Distinction
- in
- Dialectica
- volume
- 67
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 55 - 80
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000318163400003
- other:DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12011
- scopus:84876748824
- ISSN
- 1746-8361
- DOI
- 10.1111/1746-8361.12011
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- a9220c3f-a7dc-463a-a1c7-164421b712c2 (old id 3616061)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:40:52
- date last changed
- 2022-03-22 01:18:38
@article{a9220c3f-a7dc-463a-a1c7-164421b712c2,
abstract = {{Powers are popularly assumed to be distinct from, and dependent upon, inert qualities, mainly because it is believed that qualities have their nature independently of other properties while powers have their nature in virtue of a relation to distinct manifestation property. George Molnar and Alexander Bird, on the other hand, characterise powers as intrinsic and relational. The difficulties of reconciling the characteristics of being intrinsic and at the same time essentially related are illustrated in this paper and it is argued that the reasons for thinking of powers as essentially relational are based on misguided epistemological consideration. Finally, I present a way of thinking of fundamental properties as primitive natures that we can only understand in virtue of what they do but which we should not think of as being ontologically constituted by these doings. According to this view, properties are both qualities and powers.}},
author = {{Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur}},
issn = {{1746-8361}},
keywords = {{Metaphysics; Properties; Powers; Qualities; Categorical/Dispositional Distinction}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{55--80}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Dialectica}},
title = {{Properties: Qualities, Powers, or Both?}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12011}},
doi = {{10.1111/1746-8361.12011}},
volume = {{67}},
year = {{2013}},
}