Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)
(2017) In STANCE Working Papers Series 2017(6). p.1-43- Abstract
- Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with... (More)
- Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/b2074f09-f3d1-45be-afdf-5bc4ed96eaed
- author
- Sabaté Domingo, Oriol LU ; Espuelas, Sergio and Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso
- organization
- publishing date
- 2017-12
- type
- Working paper/Preprint
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Military spending, coup d’état, Spain
- in
- STANCE Working Papers Series
- volume
- 2017
- issue
- 6
- pages
- 43 pages
- project
- State-Making and the Origins of Global Order in the Long Nineteenth Century and Beyond
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- b2074f09-f3d1-45be-afdf-5bc4ed96eaed
- date added to LUP
- 2017-12-14 13:44:32
- date last changed
- 2021-03-22 16:11:59
@misc{b2074f09-f3d1-45be-afdf-5bc4ed96eaed,
abstract = {{Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain.}},
author = {{Sabaté Domingo, Oriol and Espuelas, Sergio and Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso}},
keywords = {{Military spending; coup d’état; Spain}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Working Paper}},
number = {{6}},
pages = {{1--43}},
series = {{STANCE Working Papers Series}},
title = {{Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)}},
volume = {{2017}},
year = {{2017}},
}