Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack on AES using Low-end Equipment
(2020) In ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology 14(2). p.139-148- Abstract
- Side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms targets the implementation of the algorithm. Information can leak from the implementation in several different ways and, in this paper, electromagnetic radiation from an FPGA is considered. We examine to which extent key information from an AES implementation can be deduced using a low-end oscilloscope. Moreover, we examine how the antenna's distance from the FPGA affects the results in this setting. Our experiments show that some key bits indeed can be inferred from the measurements, despite having a far from optimal setting.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/b75049c9-716d-445d-9ef4-d05806660f8d
- author
- Westman, Oskar and Hell, Martin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020-06-03
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology
- volume
- 14
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 139 - 148
- publisher
- Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Communications and Information Technology Association
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85086330883
- ISSN
- 2286-9131
- DOI
- 10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925
- project
- Cyber Security for Next Generation Factory (SEC4FACTORY)
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- b75049c9-716d-445d-9ef4-d05806660f8d
- date added to LUP
- 2020-06-11 14:09:58
- date last changed
- 2023-04-10 14:45:49
@article{b75049c9-716d-445d-9ef4-d05806660f8d, abstract = {{Side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms targets the implementation of the algorithm. Information can leak from the implementation in several different ways and, in this paper, electromagnetic radiation from an FPGA is considered. We examine to which extent key information from an AES implementation can be deduced using a low-end oscilloscope. Moreover, we examine how the antenna's distance from the FPGA affects the results in this setting. Our experiments show that some key bits indeed can be inferred from the measurements, despite having a far from optimal setting.}}, author = {{Westman, Oskar and Hell, Martin}}, issn = {{2286-9131}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{06}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{139--148}}, publisher = {{Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Communications and Information Technology Association}}, series = {{ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology}}, title = {{Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack on AES using Low-end Equipment}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925}}, doi = {{10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2020}}, }