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Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack on AES using Low-end Equipment

Westman, Oskar and Hell, Martin LU (2020) In ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology 14(2). p.139-148
Abstract
Side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms targets the implementation of the algorithm. Information can leak from the implementation in several different ways and, in this paper, electromagnetic radiation from an FPGA is considered. We examine to which extent key information from an AES implementation can be deduced using a low-end oscilloscope. Moreover, we examine how the antenna's distance from the FPGA affects the results in this setting. Our experiments show that some key bits indeed can be inferred from the measurements, despite having a far from optimal setting.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology
volume
14
issue
2
pages
139 - 148
publisher
Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Communications and Information Technology Association
external identifiers
  • scopus:85086330883
ISSN
2286-9131
DOI
10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925
project
Cyber Security for Next Generation Factory (SEC4FACTORY)
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
b75049c9-716d-445d-9ef4-d05806660f8d
date added to LUP
2020-06-11 14:09:58
date last changed
2023-04-10 14:45:49
@article{b75049c9-716d-445d-9ef4-d05806660f8d,
  abstract     = {{Side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms targets the implementation of the algorithm. Information can leak from the implementation in several different ways and, in this paper, electromagnetic radiation from an FPGA is considered. We examine to which extent key information from an AES implementation can be deduced using a low-end oscilloscope. Moreover, we examine how the antenna's distance from the FPGA affects the results in this setting. Our experiments show that some key bits indeed can be inferred from the measurements, despite having a far from optimal setting.}},
  author       = {{Westman, Oskar and Hell, Martin}},
  issn         = {{2286-9131}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{06}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{139--148}},
  publisher    = {{Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Communications and Information Technology Association}},
  series       = {{ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology}},
  title        = {{Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack on AES using Low-end Equipment}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925}},
  doi          = {{10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925}},
  volume       = {{14}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}