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Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption

Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger LU (2022) In Frontiers in Psychology 13.
Abstract
I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that... (More)
I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation—the so-called no-consciousness reply—seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
higher-order theory, misrepresentation, conscioiusness, HOT theory, functionalism, materialism, higher-order misrepresentation
in
Frontiers in Psychology
volume
13
publisher
Frontiers Media S. A.
external identifiers
  • scopus:85127924220
  • pmid:35369174
ISSN
1664-1078
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2022.804896
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
b7bea7e0-e40b-476a-8fa8-9bb7c15675da
date added to LUP
2022-03-18 09:47:57
date last changed
2022-09-17 03:00:17
@article{b7bea7e0-e40b-476a-8fa8-9bb7c15675da,
  abstract     = {{I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation—the so-called no-consciousness reply—seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept.}},
  author       = {{Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger}},
  issn         = {{1664-1078}},
  keywords     = {{higher-order theory; misrepresentation; conscioiusness; HOT theory; functionalism; materialism; higher-order misrepresentation}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{03}},
  publisher    = {{Frontiers Media S. A.}},
  series       = {{Frontiers in Psychology}},
  title        = {{Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.804896}},
  doi          = {{10.3389/fpsyg.2022.804896}},
  volume       = {{13}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}