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Fitting-attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2018) In Philosophical Quarterly 68(272). p.560-579
Abstract (Swedish)
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, it’s proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good, the other to good-for; or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counter-intuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone’s sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the... (More)
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, it’s proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good, the other to good-for; or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counter-intuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone’s sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value. (Less)
Abstract
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the... (More)
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Impersonal value, personal value, good-for, fitting-attitude analysis, for-someone's sake attitudes, Logical Consequence Argument, mood of an attitud
in
Philosophical Quarterly
volume
68
issue
272
pages
19 pages
publisher
Oxford University Press
ISSN
0031-8094
DOI
10.1093/pq/pqx060
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
bbd64d96-e1dc-44b0-bd5e-19655820c295
date added to LUP
2017-10-05 23:48:09
date last changed
2018-07-01 04:30:00
@article{bbd64d96-e1dc-44b0-bd5e-19655820c295,
  abstract     = {A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value.},
  author       = {Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  issn         = {0031-8094},
  keyword      = {Impersonal value,personal value,good-for,fitting-attitude analysis,for-someone's sake attitudes,Logical Consequence Argument,mood of an attitud},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {272},
  pages        = {560--579},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  series       = {Philosophical Quarterly},
  title        = {Fitting-attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx060},
  volume       = {68},
  year         = {2018},
}